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ENTOMBED WRITS’ EFFECTIVE RENAISSANCE:
SURVEYING AND SEALING FEDERAL RULE OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE 60(B)’S INTERPRETIVE GAPS
AMIR SHACHMUROVE*
“Finality is death. Perfection is finality. Nothing is perfect. There are lumps in it.” 1
ABSTRACT
For centuries, the hoary principle of finality and the Latin-denominated writs
devised so as to mollify its obduracy cast fearsome shadows, unchallenged within the
courts of the British Isles. In the United States, these expatiated doctrines stalked with
equal aplomb from the time of Chief Justice John James Marshall to the advent of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. For nearly 150 years, therefore, federal procedural
law recognized only the skimpiest opportunities for renewed introspection afforded
by these increasingly anachronistic constructs, ones nonetheless imbued with more
and more of antiquity’s nearly sacerdotal sheen with each passing year.
In time, as counsel pirouetted and courts pondered, litigious pressures spawned
ornate exceptions. These writs’ interminable permutations forced countless parties
either to comply with dubious judgments or to navigate perplexing doctrinal snares in
the farfetched hopes of winning even a modicum of relief. This oppressive reality
inevitably fed frustration with not just the common law’s almost farcical formalism
but also its and equity’s persistent arbitrariness.
From its original iteration’s release, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60 has sought
to extirpate this century’s worth of debris. Still, the substance of this provision then
empowered, as it still does, the federal courts to balance the need to rectify corrupted
judgments against the sanctity bequeathed onto all final judgments, including
blemished ones, by murky past and mesmeric precedent. In contrast to a nebulous

* A former law clerk to federal judges in California, Florida, Louisiana, and New York, Amir
Shachmurove is an associate with the Wilmington, Delaware, and Washington, DC, offices of
Reed Smith LLP who can usually be reached at ashachmurove@reedsmith.com. With its
slightly less academic bent, this Article is therefore dedicated to three deeply-loved members
of his extended family: Clayton Cravey, Dale W. Cravey, and Lynn Cravey. As always, the
author credits his beloved wife, Mrs. Lindsey Dunn Shachmurove, and the editors who slaved
over its production and extirpated much of his verbosity for whatever slight value this piece
may boast. Naturally, all the views expressed, and mistakes made, herein belong to the author
alone, and nothing contended herein should be treated as legal advice.

1 JAMES STEPHENS, THE CROCK OF GOLD 35 (1912).
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common law, its bases for a final judgment’s negation promised more definite justice
for litigants and greater clarity and certainty for courts, counselors, and parties.
Especially after its first amendment, Rule 60 seemed more than sufficient to secure
these eminent ends. Over the ensuing six decades, even as Rule 60(a)’s clerical nature
aroused little tempest, the opposite has come to pass with regard to Rule 60(b). Swayed
by notions of fabled geneses and visions of fictive yesteryears, judicial exegeses
enveloped the latter in a befuddling haze. The entropy that many warned would arrive
upon finality’s obviation has been realized as a result of its marginal relaxation via
Rule 60(b), curdling the hope for equipoise at the heart of the procedural compendium
of which it is but one part.
Perhaps most disturbingly, no compelling reason can validate this debasement. At
least if verifiable history and explicit text are fairly read and fairly weighed, the time
to remove this interpretive moss from the text of Rule 60(b) arrived long ago. Both
justice and economy, federal procedural law’s preeminent lodestars, still impel as
much. With only a digression (or two or four), this Article aims to achieve this feat for
the academic and the practitioner alike.
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I. INTRODUCTION

“[S]omething like a one-man intelligence agency” in the “fractious republic of
letters of late-seventeenth century Europe,”2 the congenitally indecisive Gottfried
Wilhelm von Leibniz3 characterized the concept of finality as necessary so as to
“purge[] the mechanical philosophy from the profanity imputed to it.”4 Nature’s “final
causes” had proven useful in physics and mathematics, he knew; their utility supplied
objective evidence, independent of divine will, of the perfection of God’s world, he
therefore inferred.5 To Leibniz, the material world’s intelligent comprehension
required a minimal appreciation of finality’s nuances and manifestations.6 For all its
apparent complexities, Leibniz’s oeuvre is at least clear as to the foundational
importance of this conceit to the analysis of any machine, whether made of nerve and
sinew, gears and springs, or even more ineffable things.7
Equally enamored of its own arcana, the legal world has always seen much virtue
in unperturbable finality, but has also exhibited unease at the perpetration of grave
injustice that may be excused under this standard’s beguiling banner for just as long.

2 MATTHEW STEWART, THE COURTIER AND THE HERETIC: LEIBNIZ, SPINOZA, AND THE FATE OF
GOD IN THE MODERN WORLD 109 (2007).
3 KARL JASPERS, THE GREAT PHILOSOPHERS: XENOPHANES, DEMOCRITUS, EMPEDOCLES,
BRUNO, EPICURUS, BOEHME, SCHELLING, LEIBNIZ, ARISTOTLE, HEGEL 178 (1962).
4 Gottfried W. Leibniz, Discourse on Metaphysics, in DISCOURSE ON METAPHYSICS AND
OTHER ESSAYS § XXIII (Roger Ariew & Daniel Garber trans., Hackett Publishing 1989) (1686)
[hereinafter LEIBNIZ, HACKETT TRANS.]; see also MATTHEW L. JONES, THE GOOD LIFE IN THE
SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION: DESCARTES, PASCAL, LEIBNIZ, AND THE CULTIVATION OF VIRTUE 264
(2008) (analyzing concept). In some translations and commentary, “profanity” takes the place
of “impiety.” See, e.g., GOTTFRIED W. LEIBNIZ, DISCOURSE ON METAPHYSICS § XXIII (Gonzalo
Rodriguez-Pereyra trans., Oxford Univ. Press 2020) (1686); JONES, supra note 4, at 264.
However translated, Leibniz apparently equated either with “inaccessibility.” ERNST CASSIRER,
THE WARBURG YEARS (1919–1933): ESSAYS ON LANGUAGE, ART, MYTH, AND TECHNOLOGY 326
(2013).
5 LEIBNIZ, HACKETT TRANS., supra note 4, §§ XXI–XXIII at XXII–XVI.
6 Enrico Pasini, The Organic Versus the Living in the Light of Leibniz’s Aristotelianisms, in
MACHINES OF NATURE AND CORPOREAL SUBSTANCES IN LEIBNIZ 92 (Justin E.H. Smith & Ohad
Nachtomy eds., 2011).
7 How this belief influenced Leibniz’s polymorphic work, however, is harder to peg. Leibniz
used the term “final cause” in his physics and metaphysics, and whether its intended meaning
differed, whether in whole or in part, from one to the other continues to divide historians and
scholars of philosophy and mathematics. It is a question better left to other disciplines and other
days.
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When the drafters of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure8 forsook much of the common
law’s often remorseless formalism,9 they therefore engrafted certain equitable notions
unto their newfangled procedural edifice.10 Yes, the grave respect paid to finality
within Anglo-Saxon law, the sacredness attributed to the final judgment of any court11
with certain jurisdiction, would still find expression in the doctrines of collateral
estoppel, res judicata, and stare decisis,12 among others less definite jurisprudential
tenets.13 But equity’s hoary vagaries—or at least those granted a stamp of approval,
whether implicitly or explicitly, by the Rules’ actual text or official commentary—
would henceforth temper its occasionally unreasonable severity.14 After all, the
concept embodied in the pointed words of the Honorable (and “big, grim-faced”15)

8 In this Article, any references to “Rule” or “Rules” are to one or more provisions of this
procedural compendium, and any reference to “Committee” or “Advisory Committee” is to the
Advisory Committee on Rules of Civil Procedure, unless otherwise noted.
9 See Amir Shachmurove, Policing Boilerplate: Reckoning and Reforming Rule 34’s
Popular—Yet Problematic—Construction, 37 N. Ill. U. L. REV. 203, 209–12 (2017) [hereinafter
Shachmurove, Boilerplate] (discussing Rules’ background).
10 See Amir Shachmurove, Disruptions’ Function: A Defense of (Some) Form Objections
Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 12 SETON HALL CIR. REV. 161, 167–70 (2016)
[hereinafter Shachmurove, Disruptions] (stressing this motive’s primacy in the Rules’ creation).
11 In this Article, unless otherwise noted, all references to “district court” and “circuit” are to
United States District Courts and United States Courts of Appeals, identified by number,
respectively. If capitalized but not the first word in a sentence, the term “Supreme Court” stands
for the Supreme Court of the United States in accordance with The Bluebook: A Uniform System
of Citation. Similarly, all references to “court” or “federal court” and “state court” are to any
one such trial or appellate courts at the federal and state levels, respectively.
12 Cf. Watts v. Pinckney, 752 F.2d 406, 410 (9th Cir. 1985) (“[T]he doctrine of res judicata
does not apply to direct attacks on judgments.”); Satterfield v. Pfizer, Inc., Nos. 04 Civ. 3782
(KMW)(GWG), 98 Civ. 8040 (KMW)(GWG), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4180, at *14–15,
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 17, 2005) (“The doctrine of collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, is related to
the doctrine of res judicata and bars a party from relitigating an issue which has previously been
decided against him in a proceeding in which he had a fair opportunity to fully litigate the
point.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). Ever inventive, courts also tend to find other ways
to circumvent finality’s stridency. Cf. Amy E. Sloan, A Government of Laws and Not Men:
Prohibiting Non-Precedential Opinions by Statute or Procedural Rule, 79 IND. L.J. 711, 712–
13 (2004) (discussing this effect of the judiciary’s issuance of non-precedential opinions).
13 The standard governing motions for reconsideration is another example of the modern
sway exercised by this same principle. Namely, even though Rules “do not mention motions for
reconsideration,” courts have long allowed for their filing, but also subjected such motions to
the rigorous touchstones for review imputed into Rules 59 and 60. Broadway v. Norris, 193
F.3d 987, 989 (8th Cir. 1999); see also, e.g., Shelton v. Young’s Welding & Mach. Shop, LLC,
No. 8:14CV165, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3119, at *2–3 (D. Neb. Mar. 12, 2015) (citing
Broadway, 193 F.3d at 989).
14 Dennis M. Kelly, Note, Federal Rule 60(B): Finality of Civil Judgments v. Self-Correction
by District Court of Judicial Error of Law, 43 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 98, 98 (1967).
15 86 CONG. REC. S2472 (Apr. 24, 1940).
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Owen Josephus Roberts16—“This tendency [of self-correction] . . . indicates an
intolerance for what those who have composed this [C]ourt in the past have
conscientiously and deliberately concluded, and involves an assumption that
knowledge and wisdom reside in us which was denied to our predecessors[]”17—
elicited ready reverence in each generation of lawyers, judges, and scholars,18 an
attitude likely familiar to, if not necessarily shared by, the Rules’ leading architects.19
As the product of these disparate pressures,20 “[t]he general purpose” of Rule 60,
the one provision relevant to the revisiting of any final judgment or order within nearly
any federal court21 since 1938,22 is “to strike a proper balance between the conflicting
principles that litigation must be brought to an end and that justice must be done.”23

16 Originally cast as a liberal, then as a conservative, Justice Roberts famously dropped his
hostility to the constitutionality of the New Deal in late 1936. His vote in NLRB v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Co. thus memorably became known as “[t]he switch in time that saved nine.”
LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 549 (3d ed. 2005).
17 Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 666 (1944) (Roberts, J., dissenting).
18 See State v. Harris, 895 N.W.2d 592, 598 n.3 (Minn. 2017) (“‘[I]t is true that stare decisis
does not apply with the same strictness in some fields of law as in others . . . . However, it is
not inapplicable in any field.’” (quoting State ex rel. Foster v. Naftalin, 74 N.W.2d 249, 267
(Minn. 1956))); State v. Ramey, 721 N.W.2d 294, 304 (Minn. 2006) (Gildea, J., concurring)
(citing Foster, 74 N.W.2d at 268, which quoted Justice Roberts’ language from Smith, 321 U.S.
at 666).
19 See James Wm. Moore & Elizabeth B.A. Rogers, Federal Relief from Civil Judgments, 55
YALE L.J. 623, 630–34 (1946) (discussing Rule 60’s drafting). On the other hand, an entirely
different view dictated the replacment of the common law’s marginal discovery regime with the
Rules’ fifth title. Shachmurove, Boilerplate, supra note 9, at 209–12.
20 Moore & Rogers, supra note 19, at 623–26.
21 The Rules apply in nearly every federal tribunal, whether under Article I or Article III. For
instance, Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9024 makes Rule 60, subject to three
exceptions, applicable in any United States Bankruptcy Court, an Article I tribunal. FED. R.
BANKR. P. 9024. Contrary examples, of course, can be posited. For instance, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit once held that its special masters lack any inherent
Rule 60(b) authority. Patton v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., 25 F.3d 1021, 1027
(Fed. Cir. 1994).
22 The original Rule 60 was promulgated on December 20, 1937, and became effective on
September 16, 1938. Charles E. Clark, The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 1938-1958: Two
Decades of the Federal Civil Rules, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 435, 436 n.8 (1958). The current version
of Rule 60(b) came about via amendments promulgated on December 27, 1947, and effective
as of March 19, 1948. Id. In referring to any amendment, this Article uses its effective, rather
than drafting or promulgation date, unless otherwise noted.
23 Boughner v. Sec’y of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 572 F.2d 976, 977 (3d Cir. 1978); see also,
e.g., Cessna Fin. Corp. v. Bielenberg Masonry Contracting, Inc., 715 F.2d 1442, 1444 (10th Cir.
1983) (“[This] rule seeks to strike a delicate balance between two countervailing impulses: the
desire to preserve the finality of judgments and the ‘incessant command of the court’s
conscience that justice be done in light of all the facts.’” (quoting Seven Elves, Inc. v. Eskenazi,
635 F.2d 396, 401 (5th Cir. 1981))).
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In cautious pursuit of this venerable objective, however, Rule 60(b) authorizes relief
based only on certain enumerated circumstances,24 from extrinsic fraud25 to shapeless
equity,26 and has been deemed generally applicable “only in exceptional
circumstances.”27 Problematically, even as federal courts broadly concur as to the
import of Rule 60(b)(1)–(4), illogical prestidigitation and misapprehended precedent
beleaguer the regnant construction of Rule 60(b)’s final two bases. 28 To a startling
degree, the disconcerting horrors ascribed to the common law’s writs in the years prior
to Rule 60’s adoption and conjectured by its opponents have been realized,29 doctrinal
anarchy reborn.
To an account of the background and parameters of this sorry state, this Article
commits itself over the course of two substantive parts. In three sections, Part II lines
the general scheme for post-judgment relief afforded by the Rules. Part II.A recounts
this paradigm’s roots; Part II.B discusses Rules 6(b), 55, 59, and 60(a), (c), and (d);
and Part II.C delves into Rule 60(b)’s six independent grounds. Though Part II features
little that is truly novel, its summation may yet aid busy practitioners as well as harried
scholars who need to apprehend today’s divides over these provisions’ ambiguities.
Having dispensed with the completely contextual and the purely practical, Part III
moves beyond settled, albeit sloppily mapped, terrain. In Part III.A, it synopsizes the
principles relevant to the construal of every Rule. A juridical and academic mélange
too often overlooks this concatenation, but because these tenets should alone govern,
they merit collation here—and careful use beyond just Rule 60(b). Fully jumping into
an area not yet subject to sustained and thorough scholarly dissection, Part III.B

24 Broadway v. Norris, 193 F.3d 987, 990 (8th Cir. 1999); see also, e.g., Nutter v. Wefald,
No. 90-1436-SAC, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7001, at *4 (D. Kan. Apr. 29, 1997) (describing the
grounds under Rule 60(b) as “limited” and the provision itself as “a very limited avenue of relief
reserved for only the most extraordinary and exceptional circumstances”).
25 FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(3); Bailey v. IRS, 188 F.R.D. 346, 354–55 (D. Ariz. 1998).
26 FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(5); Burt v. Cnty. of Contra Costa, No. 73-cv-00906-JCS, 2014 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 7935, at *59–60 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 2014).
27 Boughner, 572 F.2d at 977.
28 Cf. MacArthur v. San Juan Cnty., 405 F. Supp. 2d 1302, 1326 (D. Utah 2005) (faulting a
petitioner for failing to assert any basis for relief under Rules 59(e), 60(a), or 60(b)(1), (4) or
(6) sufficient to meet the applicable standards under those rules, such as “manifest errors of
law,” or “obvious errors of law,” “newly discovered evidence,” an intervening change in the
law, “plain usurpation of power,” or even “extraordinary circumstances”).
29 1 ABRAHAM C. FREEMAN, FREEMAN ON JUDGMENTS 377 (6th ed. 1925) (characterizing the
liberality of New York’s courts in the matter of opening judgments as “seem[ingly]” regarding
such final decisions “not as inviolate and enduring testimonials, but as temporary structures to
be torn down, remodeled, or rebuilt whenever the builders feel competent to improve the
original workmanship or design”); see also, e.g., Mahnich v. S. S.S. Co., 321 U.S. 96, 112
(1944) (Roberts, J., dissenting) (“The evil resulting from overruling earlier considered decisions
must be evident . . . . Respect for tribunals must fall when the bar and the public come to
understand that nothing that has been said in prior adjudication has force in a current
controversy.”); Citizens’ Nat’l Bank v. Branden, 126 N.W. 102, 104 (N.D. 1910) (quoting
FREEMAN, supra note 29, at 377).
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pinpoints and appraises the hermeneutic problems needlessly manufactured by the
prevalent misconstruction of Rule 60(b)’s third and final two subparagraphs, including
its vaguest of rationales.
As this Article ultimately shows, an encyclopedic analysis consistent with past
discursive and present interpretive dictates exposes a truth equal parts egregious and
extraordinary: in a misguided effort to honor the Rules’ overall spirit, Rule 60(b)(3)
has been made more complicated than it need be, Rule 60(b)(5)’s plain meaning has
been mangled, and Rule 60(b)(6) has been rewritten. From the moment of their
introduction, these errata have stymied realization of the prime purposes of these
paragraphs.30 Based on their ongoing ossification, the time for their expungement
passed long ago.31 In this case, the core virtues—predictability and certainty—of the
rule of law now cry for their abandonment,32 not their continuance, no less than the
prose and past of Rule 60(b).
II. RELEVANT LAW: TEXT AND CONSTRUCTION
A.
1.

Enshrouded Origins
The Common Law’s Pillars

Originally a short written command issued by a person in authority and “tested”
or sealed by him with proof of its genuineness, the English “writ” took many forms,33
surfacing at different times either in clusters or all alone.34 Sometime before the tenth
century, the first recognizable versions cropped up, as officials in England began

30 Stephen E. Ludovici, Note, Rule 60(b)(4): When the Courts of Limited Jurisdiction Yield
to Finality, 66 FLA. L. REV. 881, 882 (2015).
31 Many state courts’ rules of procedure often mirror the Rules. E.g., ALASKA R. CIV. P. 60(b);
FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.540(b); MASS. R. CIV. P. 60(b). As such, the analysis in this Article can be
applied to any one of these state equivalents, albeit only to the extent they have been similarly
misinterpreted.
32 See Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 357 (1991)
(concluding that such interests militated in favor of one source of law); cf. Hertz Corp. v. Friend,
559 U.S. 77, 94 (2010) (“Complex jurisdictional tests complicate a case, eating up time and
money as the parties litigate, not the merits of their claims, but which court is the right court to
decide those claims.”); Amir Shachmurove, On Dicta’s Trail: Espinosa’s Messy Repercussions,
NORTON BANKR. L. ADVISER, Jan. 2018, at 1 (employing this logic against the Court’s
bankruptcy decision in United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 559 U.S. 260 (2010)).
33 Because this is no place to trace the convoluted history of the common law writs, this
Article gives only the slight sketch necessary for an understanding of its thesis. See also infra
note 81.
34 Edward Jenks, The Prerogative Writs in English Law, 32 YALE L.J. 523, 523 (1923). A
notable scholar, Edwards Jenks based at least some of his conclusions on errors likely due to
the limited historical evidence then available. E.g., William F. Duker, The English Origins of
the Writ of Habeas Corpus: A Peculiar Path to Fame, 53 N.Y.U. L. REV. 983, 983–84 (1978);
S.A. de Smith, The Prerogative Writs, 11 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 40, 40 n.1, 42 n.18, 43 n.23a (1951).
Despite its flaws, however, his mostly accurate work retains an outsized influence.
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regularly availing themselves of these so-called “writs” to convey orders.35 Upon his
conquest of England in 1066, William I of Normandy opted not to dissolve this
superstructure in toto but to extend it by reframing the writs in Latin, rather than
Anglo-Saxon, and increasing the range of royal commands and decisions;36 in a
country without a true national judiciary, these reconceived writs, along with the
creation of new royal courts, started the unification of mores later known as the
common law.37 Yet, while the King’s Writ “swallowed up . . . all . . . rival and inferior
writs,” soon after William’s coronation, circumstances halted and reversed this trend,
and the diffusion and transmutation equally characteristic of the common law
commenced.38 Though it may have existed as early as 1282, Parliament first
authorized one such writ in 1336—that of audita querela defendentis39—as a remedy
for judgment debtors .40 This particular writ “replaced the action of deceit and the writ
of error to a large extent in matters arising under the statutes of merchants and staple”;
by the late Middle Ages, “victims of the forgery or fraudulent manipulation of any
type of procedure or records” utilized it as “a general remedy.”41 Generally, when the
writ pleaded for correction of an error of fact by (and in) the same court that rendered
the judgment, it was “called a writ of error coram nobis if it be in the King’s Bench,
and a writ of error coram vobis if it be in the Common Pleas.” 42 The addressee

35 See GEORGE O. SAYLES, THE MEDIEVAL FOUNDATIONS OF ENGLAND 333 (1950)
(comparing the writs of Anglo-Saxon and Norman England); see also, e.g., Duker, supra note
34, at 985–87 (providing the pre-Norman ancestor of the writ of habeas corpus); Geoffrey C.
Hazard, Jr., The Early Evolution of the Common Law Writs: A Sketch, 6 AM. J. LEGAL HIST.114,
114–15 (1962) (surveilling Anglo-Saxon political and legal structure).
36 DAVID C. DOUGLAS, WILLIAM THE CONQUEROR: THE NORMAN IMPACT UPON ENGLAND 293
(1964); see also Duker, supra note 34, at 987–98 (surveying the Norman centralization of the
English judicial system). For the sake of readability, and absent a direct quote, this Article
italicizes the title of each common-law writ only when it first appears.
37 E.g., DANA ZARTNER, COURTS, CODES, AND CUSTOM: LEGAL TRADITION AND STATE POLICY
TOWARD INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 48 (2014); DOUGLAS,
supra note 36, at 292–95; Hazard, supra note 35, at 117–19.
38 Jenks, supra note 34, at 523–24. For an overview of the courts of common law and the
High Court of Chancery, see JOHN H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY
29–46 (4th ed. 2002).
39 This Latin phrase translates to “[the] complaint [having been] heard.” Audita querela,
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
40 Ira P. Robbins, The Revitalization of the Common-Law Civil Writ of Audita Querela as a
Post-Conviction Remedy in Criminal Cases: The Immigration Context and Beyond, 6 GEO.
IMMIGR. L.J. 643, 646 (1992).
41 THEODORE F.T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 394 (5th ed. 1956).
42 See WILLIAM TIDD, PRACTICAL FORMS AND ENTRIES OF PROCEEDINGS IN THE COURTS OF
KING’S BENCH, COMMON PLEAS, AND EXCHEQUER OF PLEAS 1136 (9th ed. 1840) (emphasis
added). Outside the law, Tidd appeared in the The Personal History, Adventures, Experience
and Observation of David Copperfield the Younger of Blunderstone Rookery (Which He Never
Meant to Publish on Any Account), more commonly known as David Copperfield. In that
autobiographical novel, Uriah Heep, a character notable for his unctuousness and
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explains the different nomenclature. Because the King (or Queen) nominally presided
over the Court of the King’s (or Queen’s) Bench, the regal pronoun was used in the
former’s title, but as the writ of coram vobis was directed towards the Court of
Common Pleas, an inferior court, it was addressed with the more familiar “you.”43 In
practice, as to matters preceding judgment, the writs of audita querela and coram nobis
were indistinguishable,44 and appeal by motion eventually supplanted this duo.45 The
first uses of the writs of coram nobis and its close cousin, coram vobis46 have yet to
be uncovered, but the former did not seemingly enter English record books until the
late 1500s.47 Fortunately, this knowledge gap is practically insignificant, as surviving
accounts suggest that the distinction between the writs of coram vobis and coram nobis
was purely nominal48 and historical49 and each smoldered in obscurity.50

obsequiousness, among other unsavory attributes, unappealingly waxes. “I am improving my
legal knowledge, Master Copperfield . . . . I am going through Tidd’s Practice. Oh, what a writer
Mr. Tidd is, Master Copperfield!” CHARLES DICKENS, DAVID COPPERFIELD 250 (Global Media
2007) (1850). As often noted by literary and legal scholars, several of Dickens’ other writings
exude with his contempt for English law and scant regard for lawyers. See generally John M.
Gest, The Law and Lawyers of Charles Dickens, 53 AM. L. REG. 401 (1905) (collecting choice
quotes from Dickens’ various writings).
43 See Abraham L. Freedman, The Writ of Error Coram Nobis, 3 TEMP. L.Q. 365, 367–69
(1929) (quoting and testing sources); see also Daniel F. Piar, Using Corum Nobis to Attack
Wrongful Convictions: A New Look at an Ancient Writ, 30 N. KY. L. REV. 505, 506 n.12 (2003)
(citing Freedman, supra note 43, at 367–70).
44 7 JAMES WILLIAM MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 60.15[1] (2d ed. 1970).
45 Pickett’s Heirs v. Legerwood, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 144 (1833); Comment, Temporal Aspects
of the Finality of Judgments the Significance of Federal Rule 60(b), 17 U. CHI. L. REV. 664, 665
n.7 (1950).
46 These Latin phrases translate to “before us” and “before you,” respectively, and the
meaning of its full form, quae coram nobis resident, is “which [things] remain in our presence.”
Coram nobis, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019); Coram vobis, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019); Note, Current Treatment of Coram Nobis in Federal and New
York Courts, 33 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 98, 98–99 (1958).
47 Sir Gilbert Debenham’s Case (1561) 73 Eng. Rep. 430 (KB). Hundreds of years later, the
given year of this decision is still debatable. E.g., ELI FRANK, CORAM NOBIS: COMMON LAW –
FEDERAL – STATUTORY § 1.02 (1953); 1 WILLIAM S. HOLDSWORTH & EDWARD POTTON, A
HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 224 n.4 (1922).
48 E.g., Piar, supra note 43, at 506 n.12; Thomas D. Clark, Comment, Rule 60(b): Survey and
Proposal for General Reform, 60 CALIF. L. REV. 531, 534 n.20 (1972).
49 Comment, supra note 45, 665 n.4.
50 See FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b) advisory committee’s note to 1946 amendment (opining that “the
precise relief” afforded by, among others, the writ of coram nobis “is shrouded in ancient lore
and mystery”); see also Margaret Chon, Remembering and Repairing: The Error Before Us, in
our Presence, 8 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 643, 645 (2010) (“[N]o one really knows how coram
nobis originated.”).
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Invariably, these writs’ vague prerequisites led to more incompatible and overly
technical results whenever someone managed to retrieve one or more from academic
hibernation.51 If it so wished, a party could instead petition a superior court to review
any errors of law in a lower court’s judgment; for such a purpose, “a writ of error only-nothing more[]”—existed.52 Although Westminster53 already summoned judges who
had taken possessory assizes to answer complaints by persons who objected to their
judgment in the thirteenth century, the fourteenth witnessed the establishment of this
device as a mean for a litigant defeated in a subordinate branch to proceed against his
adversary in a superior arm of the King’s Bench.54 By its nature, this prescript brought
“up for review only errors of law, and not of fact,” though “a finding of fact may in
itself be an error in law”;55 removing the whole record into the appellate court, it could
not be used “to try the issues between the parties.”56 This narrow focus prompted the
creation of a new procedure, known as the bill of exceptions, by which the official
record of the jury and the judge could be obtained even though verbatim accounts of
the jury’s actions would not normally be created.57 In a revealing contrast, English
courts of equity operated under no such constraint, and their procedures, termed
“appeal,” authorized review of an entire case, law and facts, and the issuance of any
type of judgment thought just without regard to whether the issue had been presented

51 Clark, supra note 48, at 534.
52 E.g., Keane v. State, 166 A. 410, 412 (Md. 1933); Fugate v. State, 37 So. 554, 555 (Miss.
1904); Teller v. Wetherell, 6 Mich. 46, 49 (1858).
53 An area within Central London that extends from the River Thames to Oxford Street,
Westminster has been the home of England’s government since at least 1200 and housed the
primary palace of the Kings of England starting in the eleventh century. For these reasons,
“Westminster” became and remains a metonym for the central government of the Kingdom of
England before and after its annexation of Wales in 1542; the Kingdom of Great Britain; the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland; and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland.
54 Note, Influence of the Writ of Error on the Scope of Appellate Review in the Federal
Courts, 32 COLUM. L. REV. 860, 861 (1932).
55 Jones v. E. Mich. Motorbuses, 283 N.W. 710, 718 (Mich. 1939); accord Ernst v. State,
192 N.W. 65, 66 (Wis. 1923); see also Note, supra note 54, at 861 (characterizing this limitation
as part of the “formula commonly used,” destined to “make[] its due appearance in federal
cases”). But see, e.g., Snow v. Hardy, 3 Minn. 77 (1859) (rejecting defendant’s urging that,
although the jury were guilty of misconduct, that fact cannot be considered by the court on writ
of error); Note, supra note 54, at 862–65 (raising doubts about this supposed division).
56 Orange Belt Packing Co. v. Int’l Agric. Corp., 150 So. 264, 265 (Fla. 1933); accord, e.g.,
Wingfield v. Neall, 54 S.E. 47, 50 (W. Va. 1906); State v. Mitchell, 10 So. 746, 748 (Fla. 1892);
see also Robert J. Martineau, Considering New Issues on Appeal: The General Rule and the
Gorilla Rule, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1023, 1026–27 (1987) (summarizing writ’s early English use).
57 Martineau, supra note 56, at 1027; see also Yuval Simchi-Levi, Preservation: What Is It
Good for?, 37 PACE L. REV. 175, 178–69 (2016) (relying on this history, as told in Martineau,
supra note 56, at 1026–28).
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to the lower court first.58 And just like the writ of coram nobis “came into existence
as an ‘original’ writ in the sense that it was a writ by which a new proceeding was
commenced,” so did others, such as the writ of scire facias,59 obtained by subjects for
the purpose of rescinding royal grants, charters, and franchises at least as far back as
the sixteenth century.60
In addition to this hodgepodge, the common law birthed more, and it groaned
under the cumulative mass of the increasingly intricate writs of certiorari,61
mandamus,62 prohibition,63 procedendo,64 quo warranto,65 and habeas corpus,66 all

58 BAKER, supra note 38, at 138–41; Martineau, supra note 56, at 1027.
59 United States v. Steese, 144 F.2d 439, 446 (3d Cir. 1944) (Biggs, J., dissenting).
60 de Smith, supra note 34, at 41. For more on this writ, see Christopher Beauchamp,
Repealing Patents, 72 VAND. L. REV. 647, 655–57 (2019).
61 de Smith, supra note 34, at 46–48; Jenks, supra note 34, at 528–29. From the fourteenth
century until the middle of the seventeenth, the writ of certiorari was used to supervise the
proceedings of inferior courts of specialized jurisdiction, obtain information for administrative
purposes, bring into the Chancery or before the common-law courts judicial records and other
formal documents for a wider diversity of purposes, and remove coroners’ inquisitions and
indictments to the King’s Bench. de Smith, supra note 34, at 45–48.
62 de Smith, supra note 34, at 50–51; Jenks, supra note 34, at 529–31. By the early years of
the eighteenth century, the writ of mandamus was utilized to compel an executive or judicial
officer or agency to perform a legal duty. de Smith, supra note 34, at 50–51; Jenks, supra note
34, at 529–31.
63 de Smith, supra note 34, at 48–49; Jenks, supra note 34, at 527–28. In England, a writ of
prohibition was employed to halt the institution or prosecution of proceedings, or an aspect of
proceedings, in another tribunal when the latter was acting in excess of its jurisdiction. de Smith,
supra note 34, at 48–49; Jenks, supra note 34, at 527–28.
64 Jenks, supra note 34, at 527–28. The earliest known remedy for the refusal or neglect of
justice by a court, the writ of procedendo is an order from a court of superior jurisdiction to one
of inferior jurisdiction to proceed to judgment. ABRAHAM CARUTHERS, HISTORY OF A LAWSUIT:
OR A TREATISE ON THE PRACTICE IN SUITS AND PROCEEDINGS OF EVERY DESCRIPTION, FROM THE
BEGINNING TO THE END, IN COURTS OF LAW 532 (1866); see also, e.g., Livingston v. Dorgenois,
11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 577, 579–80, 589 (1813) (using term); State ex rel. Sponaugle v. Hein, 87
N.E.3d 722, 727 (Ohio 2017) (providing a rare example of this writ’s modern application by a
U.S. court).
65 Jenks, supra note 34, at 527–28. Historically, the English crown developed this writ of
inquiry as a means of calling upon subjects to explain some alleged abuse of the power of an
office, franchise, or liberty within its purview. Jenks, supra note 34, at 528.
66 Duker, supra note 34, at 985–1015; de Smith, supra note 34, at 43–44. First discovered
side-by-side with the writs of summons, venire facias (cause to come), pone per vadium (put to
pail), and distraint in the early Memoranda Rolls of Henry III’s Exchequer Court, the writ of
habeas corpus compelled the appearance of both ministerial officers and private persons and
was relied upon in both public and private law by the fourteenth century. Duker, supra note 34,
at 1002.
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of which traditionally fell within the class of “prerogative” writs, 67 more commonly
termed “extraordinary writs” and described as “extraordinary remedies,”68 that, at one
point, encompassed the aforementioned scire facias.69 Evidence of this
Byzantinization abounds. For example, while prisoners of state employed the writ of
habeas corpus to attain a discharge from executive confinement by the late 1500s,70
the words “habeas corpus” were previously “not connected with the idea of liberty,
and the process involved an element of the concept of due process of law only insofar
as it mirrored the refusal of the courts to decide matters without having the defendant
present.”71 Between 1604 and 1607, new or amended procedures, such as process by
attachment for contempt and the insertion of subpoena clauses to impose obedience,
the issuance of writs requiring immediate return, and the issuance of writs during
vacations, facilitated the easier, faster, and more effective use of the writ of habeas
corpus for the King’s Bench and its clientele: other courts’ prisoners.72 By the middle
of the eighteenth century, as fewer prisoners jailed by justices of the peace were
brought into King’s Bench by habeas corpus, the writ was being newly used to inspect
forms of detention that involved no allegation of wrongdoing.73
As for the writs of certiorari, mandamus, and prohibition, though they “began as
executive commands aimed at avoiding judicial proceedings,” each evolved into a
“central mechanism for the judicial control of executive action” by the middle years
of the eighteenth century.74 The expansion of the writ of mandamus is a case in point.
In 1615, though some precedent did endorse the relief—restitution of office—he
awarded in James Bagg’s Case,75 Sir Edward Coke construed the writ of restitution

67 Jenks, supra note 34, at 524–27. For a thorough discussion of this term’s history, see Frank
J. Goodnow, The Writ of Certiorari, 6 POL. SCI. Q. 493, 493–501 (1891).
68 E.g., 8 WEST’S ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW 68 (Jeffrey Lehman & Shirelle Phelps
eds., 2011); Hazard, supra note 35, at 121; JOHN DICKINSON, ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE AND THE
SUPREMACY OF LAW IN THE UNITED STATES 39–40 (1927).
69 de Smith, supra note 34, at 41.
70 See, e.g., Howel’s Case (1587) 74 Eng. Rep. 66 (CP) (discharging prisoner for insufficient
cause stated in return); Peter’s Case (1586) 74 Eng. Rep. 628 (CP) (discharging prisoner for
insufficient cause stated in return).
71 RICHARD J. SHARPE ET AL., THE LAW OF HABEAS CORPUS 2 (Oxford University Press 2011)
(1976); see also WILLIAM F. DUCKER, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF HABEAS CORPUS 8 (1980)
(deriding the belief that “habeas corpus developed primarily to protect the liberty of the subject”
as a “myth”).
72 PAUL D. HALLIDAY, HABEAS CORPUS: FROM ENGLAND TO EMPIRE 26–27 (2010).
Parliament contributed its own alterations. E.g., 31 Car. 2, c. 2 (1679); 16 Car. 1, c. 10, §§ 2–3,
6 (1641); 3 Car. 1, c. 1, §§ 5, 10 (1628).
73 HALLIDAY, supra note 72, at 32.
74 LORD WOOLF ET AL., DE SMITH’S JUDICIAL REVIEW 781 (6th ed. 2007) (emphasis omitted).
75 James Bagg’s Case (1615), 77 Eng. Rep. 1271; James E. Pfander & Jacob P. Wentzel, The
Common Law Origins of Ex parte Young, 72 STAN. L. REV. 1269, 1297–98 (2020); Jenks, supra
note 34, at 530.
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as a vehicle for a heretofore unseen assertion of jurisdiction in his capacity as Lord
Chief Justice of the Common Pleas.76 Though opposition to his vision of judicial
review prompted his dismissal just one year later,77 his successors issued even more
expansive writs of restitution; these writs’ more familiar modern moniker—
mandamus—reflected their application to an ever-wider range of conduct.78 For all
this history’s opacity, even this bowdlerization supports the “generaliza[ble]”
conclusions that the royal writs “represented interferences with established feudal or
local jurisdiction,” “were in the first instance executive directives,” and “were ad hoc
responses to particular types of situations.”79 Naturally, then, with centuries’ passage,
more and more internal fractures and independent variants sprouted,80 populating the
common law with writs with increasingly less articulable premises and defensible
pedigrees than that of the mythical Great Writ.81
Led by a class of men well versed in Great Britain’s eccentric legal mores, the
young United States first incorporated these writs into its common law and then

76 EDITH G. HENDERSON, FOUNDATIONS OF ENGLISH ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CERTIORARI AND
MANDAMUS IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY 65–76 (1963); Louis L. Jaffe, The Right to Judicial
Review I, 71 HARV. L. REV. 401, 414–16 (1958).
77 HENDERSON, supra note 76, at 70; see also John P. Dawson, Coke and Ellesmere
Disinterred: The Attack on the Chancery in 1616, 36 ILL. L. REV. 127 (1941) (discussing
broader context of Lord Chief Justice Coke’s removal).
78 HENDERSON, supra note 76, at 80–82. Lord Mansfield, for one, “characterized mandamus
with something of Coke’s sweep and flourish.” Jaffe, supra note 76, at 414.
79 Hazard, supra note 35, at 122. It is, therefore, no surprise that some saw these technical
legal remedies as equitable. See Cortney E. Lollar, Invoking Criminal Equity’s Roots, 107 VA.
L. REV. 495, 507–08 (2021) (arguing that some of these legal remedies should be so classified);
see also Samuel L. Bray, The System of Equitable Remedies, 63 UCLA L. REV. 530, 542 &
nn.52–53 (2016) (deeming the writs of habeas corpus and quo warranto to be a legal remedy).
80 Cf. de Smith, supra note 34, at 48–49 (observing that the first “primary function” of the
writ of prohibition “seems to have been to limit the jurisdiction of ecclesiastical courts” but
“later came to be used as a weapon by the common-law courts in their conflicts with the Courts
of Chancery and Admiralty,” with its identification with the Crown “help[ing] to explain the
extravagant language in which later lawyers were wont to describe its qualities”); Nichols v.
Judge of Super. Ct., 89 N.W. 691, 691 (Mich. 1902) (“The writ of prohibition is the appropriate
remedy only where the court is acting entirely without jurisdiction or in clear excess of its
jurisdiction.”).
81 Cf. United States v. George, 676 F.3d 249, 253 (1st Cir. 2012) (“The writ of error coram
nobis is of ancient lineage, tracing its roots to sixteenth century English common law.”);
Anderson v. Buchanan, 168 S.W.2d 48, 55 (Ky. 1943) (Sims, J., dissenting) (“The writ of coram
nobis appears to be the wild ass of the law which the courts cannot control. It was hoary with
age and even obsolete in England before the time of Blackstone, and courts who attempt to deal
with it ‘become lost in the mist and fog of the ancient common law.’”). For more information
regarding the writs’ background, see Pfander & Wentzel, supra note 75, at 1292–1305 &
nn.113–212 (citing some of the most commonly cited authorities on these issues).
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amplified their impact by one more act of fealty.82 While some opposition to certain
writs arose before 1783,83 federal courts grew comfortable in enforcing federal
statutory and constitutional rights through ordinary common law writs in the
nineteenth century.84 In New England and Virginia, for instance, common law writs
were in use more than a century before independence,85 and the writ of habeas corpus
appeared in the Constitution itself. 86 At the same time, in the early years of the
American republic,87 another basic jurisprudential principle checked the common
law’s Latin medley: the “term rule.”88 “[A]dequately explained as a rule of repose,”89
and conceptualized as a jurisdictional limitation,90 pursuant to this “general principle,”
every federal court retained control over any judgments issued throughout its current
term in the absence of statute providing otherwise.91 So enabled, until that period’s
denouement, these tribunals could rectify one or more incorrect rulings rendered at

82 E.g., Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 408 (1993); Jaffe, supra note 76, at 417–18; Moore
& Rogers, supra note 19, at 627.
83 Glendower Evans, Jurisdiction in Mandamus in United States Courts, 19 AM. L. REV. 505,
508–11 (1885).
84 John F. Preis, How the Federal Cause of Action Relates to Rights, Remedies, and
Jurisdiction, 67 FLA. L. REV. 849, 871–75 (2016).
85 3 WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE COMMON LAW IN COLONIAL AMERICA: THE CHESAPEAKE AND
NEW ENGLAND, 1660-1750, at 37–38, 70, 91, 120 (2016).
86 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9.
87 E.g., Hamilton v. Holcomb, 1 Johns. Cas. 29, 29 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1799); Gordon v. Frasier
& Cosbie, 2 Va. (1 Wash.) 130, 135 (1795).
88 Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 408 (1993); see also Phillips v. Negley, 117 U.S. 664,
672–73 (1886) (rejecting an appeal “conclusively negatived” by this maxim); Cameron v.
M’Roberts, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 591, 593 (1818) (finding “[t]hat in this case the court had not
power over its decree, so as to set the same aside on motion after the expiration of the term in
which it was rendered”).
89 Moore & Rogers, supra note 19, at 629.
90 See, e.g., United States v. Mayer, 235 U.S. 55, 67 70 (1914) (describing this rule in
jurisdictional terms); Peck v. Sanderson, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 42 (1855) (describing this rule in
jurisdictional terms); cf. Herrera, 506 U.S. at 408 (“The early federal cases adhere to the
common-law rule that a new trial may be granted only during the term of court in which the
final judgment was entered.”).
91 Mayer, 235 U.S. at 67; see also, e.g., Mann v. Mann, 97 S.E. 175, 181 (N.C. 1918)
(“During the term wherein any judicial act is done, the record remaineth in the breast of the
judges of the court and in their remembrance, and therefore the roll is alterable during the term,
as the judges shall direct[.]”) (quoting 1 HENRY C. BLACK, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
JUDGMENTS: INCLUDING THE DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA 227 (1891)); Walker v. Comm’rs of
Sinking Fund, 9 Miss. (1 S. & M.) 372, 379 (1843) (“As a general rule, the court may certainly
correct its proceedings during the term at which they take place, if there is any thing to amend
by.”).
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any point throughout its full span, however short or long.92 To quote its classic
formulation by the Court,
all the judgments, decrees, or other orders of the courts, however conclusive
in their character, are under the control of the court which pronounces them
during the term at which they are rendered or entered of record, and they may
then be set aside, vacated, modified, or annulled by that court.93
Under this system, during a term, courts sitting at law could—and did—grant new
trials “‘for all sorts of errors and mistakes on the part of the jury;’ and . . . for error of
law on the part of the trial judge”;94 they could—and did—even invoke the equitable
power to entertain, and grant, petitions for rehearing.95 But once that date elapsed, this
corrective power vanished, and any past decision, however flawed, became final.96 In
conjunction with the related but distinct judicial right to render judgments nunc pro
tunc,97 this rule had two long-term effects, rendering (1) judgments taken towards the
end of the term more stable than judgments taken at its beginning 98 and (2) all final
judgments, as the common law dictated according to Sir William Blackstone, “such
as at once to put an end to the action.”99 For so very long, “[t]he term of court was the

92 E.g., Zimmern v. United States, 298 U.S. 167, 169–70 (1936); Jusino v. Morales & Tio,
139 F.2d 946, 948 (1st Cir. 1944); Hasbrouck Heights v. Agrios, 10 F. Supp. 371, 372 (D.N.J.
1935).
93 Bronson v. Schulten, 104 U.S. 410, 415 (1881), quoted in, e.g., Phillips, 117 U.S. at 672–
73; see also Turner v. Indianapolis, B. & W. Ry., 24 F. Cas. 367 (C.C. D. Ind. S.D. Ill. 1878)
(“I admit the rule which denies the power of the court over a decree after the term when it was
rendered. It cannot change or alter the essential parts of the decree.”).
94 12 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE – CIVIL § 59 App. 100.
95 See Kingman & Co. v. W. Mfg., 170 U.S. 675, 679 (1898) (observing that prior opinions
did not make “any distinction between a motion for a rehearing in a suit in equity and a motion
for a new trial in an action at law”).
96 E.g., Zimmern, 298 U.S. at 169–70; City of Manning v. German Ins. Co., 107 F. 52, 56
(8th Cir. 1901); see also, e.g., Browder v. Dir., Dep’t of Corrections, 434 U.S. 257, 270 (1978)
(“At common law, a court had the power to alter or amend its own judgments during, but not
after, the term of court in which the original judgment was rendered.”); United States v. Mayer,
235 U.S. 55, 67 (1914) (“In the absence of statute providing otherwise, the general principle
obtains that a court cannot set aside or alter its final judgment after the expiration of the term at
which it was entered, unless the proceeding for that purpose was begun during that term.”);
Giant Powder Co. v. Cal. Vigorit Powder Co., 5 F. 197, 202 (C.C.D. Cal. 1880) (discussing that
court’s term jurisdiction over the case in both law and equity).
97 Thomas M. Reavley & David L. Orr, Trial Court’s Power to Amend its Judgments, 25
BAYLOR L. REV. 191, 194 & n.14 (1973).
98 Comment, supra note 45, at 666.
99 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 398 (1768); see also,
e.g., Trowbridge v. Spinning, 62 P. 125, 130 (Wash. 1900) (quoting Blackstone); Stedman v.
Poterie, 21 A. 219, 220 (Pa. 1891) (quoting Blackstone); Nacoochee Hydraulic Mining Co. v.
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critical factor in the district court’s power over its final judgments at law and in
equity,”100 the very embodiment of a judiciary’s decided preference for finality. 101
Bit by bit, as with the common law’s writs, two exceptions gained tentative
footholds. A court could always correct mere clerical errors or matters of form in a
later term.102 In fact, it could even modify the substance of a judgment in a later term
so long as it had expressly reserved control over the judgment during the term it
issued.103
By the end of the nineteenth century, precedent’s perusal revealed two basic
patterns. First, rather than a digestible and workable symmetry, the term rule and its
exemptions had established “a clumsy and arbitrary balance between the policies of
finality and correctness.”104 Second, to the ire of countless parties, its continued
preeminence and the writs’ paucity often effectively barred post-judgment
examination.105
2.

The Posts Crumble

Within the United States, cracks eventually splayed across this aged doctrinal
structure, as more and more exceptions traceable to the original writs of error coram
nobis and audita querela not just proliferated but were also transformed by virtue of
the courts’ broad discretion over these writs’ application. As one notable example, the
writ of error coram nobis originated as “an instrument used by trial courts to correct
their own fact-based errors.”106 “A defect or inaccuracy in mere matters of form” had
always been subject to correction “notwithstanding the end of the term,” 107 but this
once-clearly demarcated writ “grew beyond the correction of mistakes of fact and

Davis, 40 Ga. 309, 320 (1869) (quoting Blackstone); Turner v. Browder, 57 Ky. 825, 827 (1857)
(quoting Blackstone).
100 Moore & Rogers, supra note 19, at 627.
101 Ronan E. Degnan, Rehearing in American Appellate Courts, 34 CAN. B. REV. 898, 903
(1956).
102 E.g., Fairmont Creamery Co. v. Minnesota, 275 U.S. 70, 72 (1927); Bank of the U.S. v.
Moss, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 31, 38 (1847).
103 E.g., Bernards v. Johnson, 314 U.S. 19, 29–30 (1941); United States v. Swift & Co., 286
U.S. 106, 114 (1931).
104 David G. Seykora, Recall of Appellate Mandates in Federal Civil Litigation, 64 CORNELL
L. REV. 704, 708 (1979).
105 Dustin B. Benham, Twombly and Iqbal Should (Finally) Put the Distinction between
Intrinsic and Extrinsic Fraud out of Its Misery, 65 S.M.U. L. REV. 649, 652 (2011).
106 Trenkler v. United States, 536 F.3d 85, 92–93 (1st Cir. 2008); see also United States v.
Morgan, 346 U.S. 502, 507 (1954) (“The writ . . . was available at common law to correct errors
of fact.”).
107 George A. Ohl & Co. v. A. L. Smith Iron Works, 288 U.S. 681, 683 (1933); accord
Wetmore v. Karrick, 205 U.S. 141, 153–54 (1907).
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became flexible enough to reach fundamental legal errors.”108 This process
commenced relatively quickly: while this writ originally centered on the presentation
of new evidentiary facts, some early uses in U.S. courts presented instances of
reconsidered judgments on other grounds than newly discovered facts. 109 Not
insignificantly, the distinction between extrinsic and intrinsic fraud occasionally
relevant to this writ’s operation provoked objections to its ineluctable arbitrariness,110
especially in light of the infrequency of the occasions for its use in the federal system
and continuous but limited use at the state level.111 In these years, though each was
an independent remedial means, the coverage of the writs of coram nobis, coram vobis,
and audita querela overlapped; “the distinct writs no longer covered distinct
situations.”112 Technical formalities only sometimes mattered,113 and courts appeared
less inclined to draw a distinction on whether the writs or motions were addressed to
an appellate or trial court.114 In short, by the early twentieth century, even though the
term rule held steadfast, the old equitable and common-law ancillary remedies and the
independent action in equity provided defendants with some means for attacking
inequitable judgments after the relevant term’s expiration.115 These remedies could
generally be grouped into four distinct categories—the writs and their protean kin,116
independent actions for relief,117 the inherent judicial power to modify judgments,118
and the power to disregard void ones119—but few were blind to their denotational
imprecision and substantive flimsiness.

108 Trenkler, 536 F.3d at 93.
109 Kathleen M. Bure, Coram Nobis and State v. Stinney: Why South Carolina Should
Revitalized America’s Legal Hail Mary, 68 S.C. L. REV. 917, 924 (2017).
110 Theodore R. Mann, History and Interpretation of Federal Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, 25 TEMP. L.Q. 77, (1951).
111 Morgan, 346 U.S. at 507.
112 Seykora, supra note 104, at 710.
113 See Harris v. Hardeman, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 334, 346 (1852) (blessing raising these three
writs by motion).
114 See Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 256 (1943) (Roberts,
J., dissenting) (faulting majority for disregarding this custom).
115 See S. M. Hamilton Coal Co. v. Watts, 232 F. 832, 834 (2d Cir. 1916) (“The court may
correct its judgment after the term, if there be a clerical error, or in case the judgment has been
entered by misprision of the clerk, or for any error which the old writ of error coram nobis
would have reached.”).
116 Moore & Rogers, supra note 19, at 659–82.
117 Note, Federal Rule 60(b): Relief from Civil Judgment, 61 YALE L.J. 76, 76 n.3 (1952)
[hereinafter Rule 60(b)] (collecting all four).
118 Hazel-Atlas Glass Co., 322 U.S. at 244–45.
119 Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 721–22 (1877).
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A maddening disarray thus plagued this pre-modern legal world. Despite the writs’
purportedly august historical lineage and incontrovertible reality, review under their
or related auspices was still regarded as “rare, uncommon and extraordinary.” 120 As
courts often opined, “[t]he discretionary nature of the jurisdiction to vacate a decree
once entered” was “designed to prevent too ready unravelling of judgments” and thus
“to avoid putting a premium upon continued litigation, and to promote considerateness
in judicial decision.” 121 Just as challengingly, “the precise contours” of even the most
well-known writs were “shrouded in ancient lore and mystery,” as Rule 60’s drafters
themselves observed.122 As a result, “[o]nly vague procedures governed relief from a
final judgment,” ones easy neither to discern nor to follow.123 In many’s reckoning,
so long as the writs subsisted, a whiff of baneful inevitable failure consequently clung
to any such effort.
3.

The Rules’ Arrival

In doing away with the notion that the continuation or expiration of a term even
marginally affected jurisdiction,124 the Rules attempted to bring some definitive order
to this unwieldy agglomeration of ancient law.125 After their adoption, familiarity with
the old Latin writs faded, if only briefly.126 Indeed, modern federal common law may
bear much of the blame for their survival, even revival, as the writ of error coram nobis
currently remains “available in criminal cases whether the error was in fact or law, but
applied only to that very small number of legal questions which concerned the
regularity of the proceeding itself.” 127 Sovereign in its own domain, state law
recognizes yet other writs to this day.128 Tellingly and unsurprisingly, in the areas of

120 Cooper Stevedoring Co. v. Luckenbach Overseas Corp., 231 F. Supp. 258, 259 (S.D.N.Y.
1964).
121 W.E. Hedger Transp. Corp. v. Ira S. Bushey & Sons, 155 F.2d 321, 324 (2d Cir. 1946).
122 FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b) advisory committee’s note to 1946 amendment, cited in United
States v. Beggerly, 524 U.S. 38, 42 (1998).
123 Clark, supra note 48, at 534.
124 Beggerly, 524 U.S. at 43.
125 Frigitemp Corp. Bernstein v. LeFrake (In re Frigitemp Corp.), 781 F.2d 324, 326–27 (2d
Cir. 1986); see also Preveden v. Hahn, 36 F. Supp. 952, 953 (S.D.N.Y. 1941) (discussing this
history).
126 Richard B. Amandes, Coram Nobis—Panacea or Carcinoma, 7 HASTINGS L.J. 48, 48
(1955).
127 United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502 (1954); United States v. Sawyer, 239 F.3d 31, 37
(1st Cir. 2001); see also, e.g., Trenkler v. United States, 536 F.3d 85, 90 (1st Cir. 2008)
(discussing writ); United States v. Neto, 67 F. Supp. 3d 481, 483 (D. Mass. 2014) (discussing
writ).
128 See generally Robert R. Nelson, Comment, Coram Nobis as a Post-Conviction Remedy:
Flight of the Phoenix, 32 S.D. L. REV. 300 (1987) (discussing this writ’s status under South
Dakota law).
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law still haunted by these almost antediluvian constructs, confusion over what they
apply to and when they can be used would persist years after the Rules’ arrival.129
B.

General Schematic: Motions for Post-Judgment Relief under Today’s Law
1.

Rule 6(b)

One provision—Rule 6(b)—touches upon the operation of the Rules’ postjudgment provisions by enshrining a court’s discretionary power to amend many a
deadline, yet exempting the Rules’ post-judgment provisions from its scope.130
Generally, “[w]hen an act may or must be done within a specified time” under the
Rules, “the court may, for good cause, extend the time” either “with or without motion
or notice if the court acts, or if a request is made, before the original time or its
extension expires” or “on motion made after the time has expired if the party failed to
act because of excusable neglect.”131 For whatever reason, Rule 6(b)(1) itself gives
no clue as to the definitive contours of either of its key terms: “good cause” 132 and
“excusable neglect.”133 Hoary jurisprudence, instead, supplies the denotations. In the
words of one court, the requisite “good cause” is “normally” found “in the absence of
bad faith on the part of the party seeking relief or prejudice to the adverse party.”134
The traditional standard for “excusable neglect,” in turn, has always been “at bottom
an equitable [inquiry], taking account of all relevant circumstances,” such as: (1) the
danger of prejudice to the opposing party; (2) the length of the delay and its potential
impact on the proceedings; (3) the reason for the delay; and (4) whether the movant
acted in good faith.135 This standard, however, is simply not germane to the Rules’
post-judgment provisions, for not a single deadline imposed by Rules 50(b) and (d),
52(b), 59(b), (d), and (e), and 60(b) can be extended under Rule 6(b)(1) by virtue of
Rule 6(b)(2).136
This textual distinction conveys a crucial message. Under the Rules, the avenues
of relief paved by Rules 59 and 60 are exhaustive and exclusive, the courts’ expansive

129 Cf. Carlisle v. United States, 517 U.S. 416, 429 (1996) (“‘[I]t is difficult to conceive of a
situation in a federal criminal case today where [a writ of coram nobis] would be necessary or
appropriate.’” (quoting United States v. Smith, 331 U.S. 469, 475 n.4 (1947))).
130 FED. R. CIV. P. 6(b); Wesolek v. Canadair Ltd., 838 F.2d 55, 58 (2d Cir. 1988); Baden v.
Craig-Hallum, Inc., 115 F.R.D. 582, 584 (D. Minn. 1987).
131 FED. R. CIV. P. 6(b)(1)(A)–(B); In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales Pracs. Litig., 177
F.R.D. 216, 236–37 (D.N.J. 1997).
132 FED. R. CIV. P. 6(b)(1)(A); Mickalis Pawn Shop, LLC v. Bloomberg, 465 F. Supp. 2d
543, 545 (D.S.C. 2006).
133 FED. R. CIV. P. 6(b)(1)(B); Davidson v. Keenan, 740 F.2d 129, 132 (2d Cir. 1984).
134 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1165
(2d ed. 1986); Kernisant v. City of New York, 225 F.R.D. 422, 431 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).
135 Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. P’ship, 507 U.S. 380, 395 (1993).
136 FED. R. CIV. P. 6(b)(2); Payne v. Tri-State Careflight, 322 F.R.D. 647, 669 (D.N.M. 2017).
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equitable discretion under certain other Rules137 irrelevant to their operation; the
Committee seemingly affirmed this perception as to Rule 60(b) in 1948. 138 By
implication, therefore, creative extrapolation should be undertaken with the most
assiduous care to the textual and contextual quintessence of those two provisions. 139
2.

Rule 55

Rule 55 affirms the inherent authority of any court to dismiss an action with
prejudice140 or enter a judgment by default,141 thereby bolstering the presumptive
legitimacy of these historic powers’ invocation.142 Drawn from a Massachusetts Rule
of General Practice and a Minnesota statute,143 this provision’s first paragraph plainly
announces: “When a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought
has failed to plead or otherwise defend, and that failure is shown by affidavit or
otherwise, the clerk must enter the party’s default.”144 Under this same paragraph, “no
default may be entered if the party has filed a response indicating his intent to defend
the action.”145 Courts now regularly “look[ing] beyond the presence or absence of []

137 Hunt v. DaVita, Inc., 680 F.3d 775, 780 (7th Cir. 2012) (regarding discovery); Jarvis v.
Reagan, 833 F.2d 149, 155 (9th Cir. 1987) (regarding discovery).
138 FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b) advisory committee’s note to 1946 amendment.
139 As shown below, equity is not equally relevant (or irrelevant) to Rule 59 and Rule 60.
See infra Part II.B.3–4.
140 Indep. Prods. Corp. v. Loew’s Inc., 283 F.2d 730, 733 (2d Cir. 1960); see also, e.g., Flaksa
v. Little River Marine Constr. Co., 389 F.2d 885, 888 (5th Cir. 1968) (“[T]he district court has
the authority to dismiss or to enter default judgment, depending on which party is at fault, for
failure to prosecute with reasonable diligence or to comply with its orders or rules of procedure
. . . . [T]he power is one inherent in the courts[.]”). For this reason, as some state courts once
acknowledged, an independent action in equity to obtain relief from judgment has always
existed, both before and after the adoption of any explicit permissions. E.g., Hamilton v.
Hamilton, 410 N.W.2d 508, 516 (N.D. 1987); Dunne v. Yund, 155 P. 273, 276 (Mont. 1916);
Stierlen v. Stierlen, 124 P. 226, 228 (Cal. Ct. App. 1912).
141 Shepherd v. ABC, 62 F.3d 1469, 1472 (D.C. Cir. 1995); Aoude v. Mobil Oil Corp., 892
F.2d 1115, 1118–19 (1st Cir. 1989); Phoceene Sous-Marine, S.A. v. U.S. Phosmarine, Inc., 682
F.2d 802, 806 (9th Cir. 1982).
142 Cf. Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1946) (describing the courts’ inherent power
to stay proceedings as “incidental to the power inherent in every court to control the disposition
of the causes on its docket with economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for
litigants”). More likely than not, the courts’ traditional inherent powers survived the adoption
of the Rules. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 46–47 (1991).
143 FED. R. CIV. P. 55(a) advisory committee’s note (1937).
144 FED. R. CIV. P. 55(a). Debate continues over how broadly to construe the phrase
“otherwise defend” and whether it applies to trial as opposed to only the earlier pleading stage
of litigation. See Ivy v. Thorton, 419 B.R. 787, 790–91 (In re Thornton) (Bankr. W.D. Tenn.
2009) (canvassing arguments).
145 Stevo Design, Inc. v. SBR Mktg., 968 F. Supp. 2d 1082, 1086 (D. Nev. 2013).
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formal actions to examine other evidence of active representation.”146 While a clerk
may enter a default judgment in limited situations, 147 “[i]n all other cases, the party
must apply to the court . . . .”148 Pursuant to Rule 55(c), which contains the relevant
touchstone, a “court may set aside an entry of default for good cause and . . . a final
default judgment[,]” whether entered by the clerk or the court, only “under Rule
60(b).”149
3.

Rule 59

Under Rule 59, a party may move the court to alter or amend the judgment or grant
a new trial after a judgment’s entry.150 As widely understood, this provision is “not a
vehicle for relitigating old issues, presenting the case under new theories, securing a
rehearing on the merits, or otherwise taking a second bite at the apple . . . .”151 Overall,
its five paragraphs allows for granting a new bench trial, opening the judgment,
amending findings of fact and conclusions of law or making new findings and
conclusions, and directing the entry of a new judgment.152 Rule 59 delineates a court’s
authority to order any one of these remedies “on motion,” including the ordering of a
new trial “on all or some of the issues,” in two different substantive parts.153
After a jury trial, one of two other provisions formally controls, albeit the same
general test governs. Under Rule 59(a)(1)(A), a motion for a new trial may be granted
“for any reason for which . . . [such a remedy] has heretofore been granted in an action
at law in federal court.”154 Generally, a trial judge considering a Rule 59 motion for a
new trial or to alter an issued judgment should only grant such a plea “when the jury’s

146 Jervis B. Webb Co. v. Kennedy Grp., No. 07-10571, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75182, at *3
(E.D. Mich. 2007) (alteration in original) (quoting Lutomski v. Panther Valley Coin Exch., 653
F.2d 270, 271 (6th Cir. 1981)).
147 FED. R. CIV. P. 55(b)(1); KPS & Assocs. v. Designs by FMC, Inc., 318 F.3d 1, 18 n.6 (1st
Cir. 2003).
148 FED. R. CIV. P. 55(b)(2); City of New York v. Mickalis Pawn Shop, LLC, 645 F.3d 114,
129 (2d Cir. 2011).
149 FED. R. CIV. P. 55(c); cf. Colleton Prep. Acad., Inc. v. Beazer E., Inc., 223 F.R.D. 401,
405 (D.S.C. 2004) (elaborating upon the connection between these rules).
150 FED. R. CIV. P. 59; Reid v. Neal, 688 F. App’x 613, 616 (11th Cir. 2017).
151 FED. R. CIV. P. 59(a)(1)–(2), (e); Sequa Corp. v. GBJ Corp., 156 F.3d 136, 144 (2d Cir.
1998) (internal quotation marks omitted).
152 Dunson v. Stabilis Fund II, LLC (In re Dunson), Nos. 13-10604-WHD, 13-10605-WHD,
13-10606-WHD 13-10607-WHD, 2014 Bankr. LEXIS 5271, at *5 n.3 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Sept.
16, 2014).
153 FED. R. CIV. P. 59(a)(1)(A)–(B); Ashraf-Hassan v. Embassy of Fr., 185 F. Supp. 3d 94,
111–12 (D.N.M. 2016).
154 FED. R. CIV. P. 59(a)(1)(A); Raedle v. Credit Agricole Indosuez, 670 F.3d 411, 417 (2d
Cir. 2012); Chiaverini, Inc. v. Frenchie’s Fine Jewelry, Coins & Stamps, Inc., 345 F. App’x 58,
60 (6th Cir. 2009); Brewster v. City of Poughkeepsie, 447 F. Supp. 2d 342, 347 (S.D.N.Y.
2006).
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verdict is egregious,”155 finding this provision satisfied only when “the great weight
of the evidence cuts against the verdict and . . . a miscarriage of justice would result if
the verdict were to stand.”156 More mechanistically, a proper motion for a new trial
or to alter or amend judgment under Rules 59(a)(1)(A) and 59(e),157 respectively, need
rely on one of three major grounds: (1) an intervening change in controlling law; (2)
the availability of new evidence not previously available; and (3) the need to correct
clear error of law or prevent a manifest injustice.158 Crucially, however, a Rule 59
motion cannot validly raise arguments or present evidence that was available before
the court entered the judgment.159 Case law imposes an additional evidentiary
constraint on the operation of either Rule 59(a)(1)(A) or Rule 59(e): though a judge
may freely “weigh the evidence and the credibility of witnesses and need not view the
evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict winner” under Rule 59(a)(1)(A),160
he or she “should rarely disturb a jury’s evaluation of a witness’s credibility”161 and
may not “freely substitute his or her assessment of the credibility of witnesses for that
of the jury simply because the judge disagrees with the jury.”162 Indeed, “[w]here the
resolution of the issues depended on assessment of the credibility of the witnesses, it
is proper for the court to refrain from setting aside the verdict and granting a new
trial.”163 This constriction follows from the jury’s assiduously guarded function, as
the trier of fact, to weigh conflicting evidence and determine the credibility of
witnesses.164

155 DLC Mgmt. Corp. v. Town of Hyde Park, 163 F.3d 124, 134 (2d Cir. 1998).
156 Springer v. Henry, 435 F.3d 268, 274 (3d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted);
see also, e.g., N. River Ins. Co. v. CIGNA Reinsurance Co., 52 F.3d 1194, 1218 (3d Cir. 1995)
(elucidating this standard); cf. Kellogg v. Schreiber (In re Kellogg), 197 F.3d 1116, 1119 (11th
Cir. 1999) (confining Rule 59’s bases to “newly-discovered evidence or manifest errors of law
or fact”).
157 As much precedent explains, the standards for the purposes of Rules 59(a)(1)(A) and
59(e) are functionally indistinguishable. HPS Mech., Inc. v. JMR Constr. Corp., No. 11-cv02600-JCS, 2014 WL 5451987, at *2 (N.D. Cal. 2014).
158 Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. U.S. Env’t Prot. Agency, 705 F. Supp. 698, 702 (D.D.C.
1989) (collecting cases); see also, e.g., Holmes v. City of Massillon, 78 F.3d 1041, 1045–46
(6th Cir. 1996) (enumerating similar reasons).
159 Arthur v. King, 500 F.3d 1335, 1343 (11th Cir. 2007); Michael Linet, Inc. v. Vill. of
Wellington, 408 F.3d 757, 763 (11th Cir. 2005).
160 Raedle v. Credit Agricole Indosuez, 670 F.3d 411, 418 (2d Cir. 2012).
161 DLC Mgmt. Corp. v. Town of Hyde Park, 163 F.3d 124, 134 (2d Cir. 1998).
162 United States v. Landau, 155 F.3d 93, 104 (2d Cir. 1998).
163 Metromedia Co. v. Fugazy, 983 F.2d 350, 363 (2d Cir. 1992).
164 Reid v. Neal, 688 F. App’x 613, 616 (11th Cir. 2017).
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Couched dissimilarly, Rule 59(a)(1)(B) crowns the same standard for a motion for
a new trial in a nonjury trial.165 Per this provision, a court may grant relief after such
trial’s denouement for “any reason for which a rehearing has heretofore been granted
in a suit in equity in federal court.”166 In applying this standard, a court may “open
the judgment if one has been entered, take additional testimony, amend findings of
fact and conclusions of law or make new ones, and direct the entry of a new judgment,”
albeit only “on motion for a new trial” in accordance with Rule 59(a)(2).167 As with
motions under Rule 59(a)(1)(A), the pertinent jurisprudence disfavors motions under
Rule 59(a)(1)(B) predicated on grounds not called to the trial court’s attention during
the trial, “unless the error was so fundamental that gross injustice would result,”168
and focuses on the same factors relevant to Rule 59(a)(1)(A). 169 Naturally, the
presumed purpose of this particular subdivision—“to correct manifest errors of law or
fact, or, in some limited situations, to present newly discovered evidence”170—
invariably informs this analysis.171

165 FED. R. CIV. P. 59(a)(1)(B); e.g., United States v. Carolina E. Chem. Co., 639 F. Supp.
1420, 1423 (D.S.C. 1986); United States v. 5.77 Acres of Land, 3 F.R.D. 298, 299 (E.D.N.Y.
1943).
166 FED. R. CIV. P. 59(a)(1)(B); In re Sun River Energy, Inc., 536 B.R. 872, 875–76 (Bankr.
D. Colo. 2015).
167 FED. R. CIV. P. 59(a)(2); Precision Pine & Timber, Inc. v. United States, 596 F.3d 817,
833 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
168 Lyons v. Jefferson Bank & Tr., 793 F. Supp. 989, 991 (D. Colo. 1992) (quoting WRIGHT
& MILLER, supra note 134, § 2804).
169 See, e.g., United States v. Ford Motor Co., 532 F.3d 496, 507 (6th Cir. 2008) (stating
grounds); Paleteria La Michoacana, Inc. v. Productos Lacteos Tocumbo S.A. De C.V., 247 F.
Supp. 3d 76, 107–08 (D.D.C. 2017) (stating grounds); Baranski v. United States, No. 4:11-CV123 CAS, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93600, at *5, (E.D. Mo. July 19, 2016) (observing that Rule
59(a)(1)(B) “allows a new trial to be granted in a nonjury action if a new trial might be obtained
under similar circumstances in a jury action under subdivision (a)(1)(A)” (citing WRIGHT &
MILLER, supra note 134, § 2804)). Equity most regularly recognized two grounds for a
rehearing: (1) for error of law or fact on the face of the record; and (2) for newly discovered
evidence.
170 Lyons, 793 F. Supp. at 991; see also, e.g., Hagerman v. Yukon Energy Corp., 839 F.2d
407, 414 (8th Cir. 1988) (“‘Motions for reconsideration serve a limited function: to correct
manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered evidence.’” (quoting Rothwell
Cotton Co. v. Rosenthal & Co., 827 F.2d 246, 251 (7th Cir.), as amended, 835 F.2d 710 (7th
Cir. 1987))); In re St. Marie Dev. Corp. of Mont., Inc., 334 B.R. 663 (Bankr. D. Mont. 2005)
(quoting Hagerman, 839 F.2d at 414); Graves Logging Co. v. Brazier Forest Prods. of Oregon,
Inc. (In re Brazier Forest Prods.), 122 B.R. 119, 121 (W.D. Wash. 1989) (quoting Rothwell
Cotton Co., 827 F.2d at 251).
171 E.g., Fontenot v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 791 F.2d 1207, 1219 (5th Cir. 1986); Chavez v.
City of Albuquerque, 640 F. Supp. 2d 1340, 1343 (D.N.M. 2008).
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Multiples of seven litter Rule 59. A party must tender a motion to alter or amend
a judgment “no later than 28 days after the entry of the judgment” per Rule 59(e),172
such a motion “suspend[ing] the finality of the judgment.”173 Similarly, a party must
file “[a] motion for a new trial . . . no later than 28 days after the entry of judgment.”174
When the latter “is based on affidavits, they must be filed with the motion”; “[t]he
opposing party has 14 days after being served to file opposing affidavits.”175
Thereafter, at its discretion, “[t]he court may permit reply affidavits.” 176 The same
twenty-eight day deadline applicable to parties’ motions under Rule 59(a) and (e)
extends to any court, which “may order a new trial for any reason that would justify
granting one on a party’s motion.”177 That tribunal may further grant a timely motion
for a new trial for a reason not stated in any motion so long as it hast afforded the
parties “notice and an opportunity to be heard,” and “specif[ies] the [pertinent] reasons
in its order.”178
Under Rule 59, motions to alter or amend the judgment “represent[ed] an
amalgamation” of the petitions for rehearing under Equity Rule 69 and the motions
for new trial available under the common law.179 Seemingly, courts construed it to
encompass all requests to rehear or reconsider final orders regardless of whether there
had been a trial, thereby deeming it “applicable to what were formerly petitions for
rehearing in equity”;180 the addition of Rule 59(e) codified this approach.181 While
Rule 59 eliminated reliance on court “terms,” however, it still gifted courts with only
a limited period of time in which to consider motions to alter or amend a judgment.

172 FED. R. CIV. P. 59(e); Pediatrix Screening, Inc. v. TeleChem Int’l, Inc., 602 F.3d 541, 546
(3d Cir. 2010); Lujan v. City of Santa Fe, 122 F. Supp. 3d 1215, 1230 (D.N.M. 2015); White v.
Smith, 808 F. Supp. 2d 1174, 1236 (D. Nev. 2011).
173 Blystone v. Horn, 664 F.3d 397, 414 (3d Cir. 2011); accord Rishor v. Ferguson, 822 F.3d
482, 493 (9th Cir. 2016); Curry v. United States, 307 F.3d 664, 666 (7th Cir. 2002). The
implications of this view on Rule 60 remains contested. See Bay v. Clarke, No. 2:15cv64, 2017
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8443, at *14 n.7 (E.D. Va. Jan. 20, 2017).
174 FED. R. CIV. P. 59(b); Am. Bd. of Internal Med. v. Von Muller, No. 10-CV-2680, 2012
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94436, at *8 (E.D. Pa. July 9, 2012).
175 FED. R. CIV. P. 59(c); Thomas v. United States, Nos. 2:09-cv-141, 2:06-cr-021, 2011 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 7443, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 26, 2011).
176 FED. R. CIV. P. 59(c); Sommers Co. v. Bell (In re Bell), 195 B.R. 818, 820–21 (Bankr.
S.D. Ga. 1996).
177 FED. R. CIV. P. 59(d).
178 Id.; accord King v. Deutsche-Dampfs-Ges., 397 F. Supp. 618, 622 (S.D.NY. 1974).
179 FED. R. CIV. P. 59 advisory committee’s note (1937).
180 Jusino v. Morales & Tio, 139 F.2d 946, 948 (1st Cir. 1944).
181 FED. R. CIV. P. 59 advisory committee’s note to 1946 amendment.
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To wit, “the Rules, in abolishing the term rule, did not substitute indefiniteness. On
the contrary, precise times, independent of the term, were prescribed.”182
4.

Rule 60

It is Rule 60, not Rule 55 or Rule 59, that sets forth the standard for securing relief
from a previously issued judgment or order, not just under its terms. 183 Historically,
in contrast with Rule 59, the roots of its first paragraph lies in Equity Rule 72,184 and
of its second in § 473 of California’s Civil Procedure Code.185 Like its state
progenitor, Rule 60 “does not provide relief from the consequences of a deliberate
choice, even if subsequent events reveal the choice to have been unwise.”186 Rather,
it sets “a high[] value on the social interest in the finality of litigation”187 even as it
compels solicitude for competing equitable concerns,188 a dual obligation central to
its first and second lettered paragraphs.189
a.

Rule 60(a)

“[A] clerical mistake or a mistake arising from oversight or omission, whenever
one is found in a judgment, order, or other part of the record” can be corrected by a
court sua sponte or on motion, “with or without notice,” per Rule 60(a).190 Its focus
unaffected by subsequent amendments to Rule 60(b),191 Rule 60(a)’s final sentence

182 Browder v. Dir., Dep’t of Corrections, 434 U.S. 257, 271 (1978) (citation omitted).
183 FED. R. CIV. P. 60; State Bank v. Gledhill (In re Gledhill), 76 F.3d 1070, 1077 (10th Cir.
1996).
184 Moore & Rogers, supra note 19, at 630.
185 FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b) advisory committee’s note (1937); Ledwith v. Storkan, 2 F.R.D.
539, 542 (D. Neb. 1942).
186 Park W. Galleries, Inc. v. Hochman, 692 F.3d 539, 545 (6th Cir. 2012); accord Cacevic
v. City of Hazel Park, 226 F.3d 483, 491 (6th Cir. 2000); cf. Gucci Am., Inc., v. Gold Ctr.
Jewelry, 158 F.3d 631, 635 (2d Cir. 1998) (noting that a finding of bad faith is not a prerequisite
to a conclusion that a party’s neglect was inexcusable for purposes of Rule 60(b)(1)).
187 Merit Ins. Co. v. Leatherby Ins. Co., 714 F.2d 673, 682 (7th Cir. 1983).
188 Susan Marie Lapenta, Note, Inryco, Inc. v. Metropolitan Engineering Co.: Inexcusable
Neglect by Whom?, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 695, 704–05 (1984); see also Cody v. Mello, 59 F.3d
13, 15 (2d Cir. 1995) (“This Court has expressed on numerous occasions its preference that
litigation disputes be resolved on the merits, not by default.”); Christopher G. Meadows,
Comment, Rule 60(B)(6): Whether “Tapping the Grand Reservoir of Equitable Power” is
Appropriate to Right an Attorney’s Wrong, 88 MARQ. L. REV. 997, 998–99 (2005) (discussing
briefly Rule 60(b)’s background).
189 E.g., Sartin v. McNair L. Firm PA, 756 F.3d 259, 265–66 (4th Cir. 2014) (as to Rule
60(a)); In re Taub, 421 B.R. 37, 42 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2009) (as to Rule 60(b)).
190 FED. R. CIV. P. 60(a); Sartin, 756 F.3d at 265.
191 United States v. Beggerly, 524 U.S. 38, 43 (1998); Moore & Rogers, supra note 19, at
630–31.
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itemizes only one exception to the untrammeled privilege of reappraisal for nonsubstantive errors otherwise imparted by its unadorned text: “[A]fter an appeal has
been docketed in the appellate court and while it is pending, such a mistake may be
corrected only with the appellate court’s leave.”192 At its broadest, this particular rule
allows for a judgment’s modification so as to reflect “the actual intentions of the court
and the parties”193 and “necessary implications of the court’s decision.”194 Changes
affecting any party’s substantive rights sit outside Rule 60(a)’s grasp, but “[a]s long
as the intentions of the parties are clearly defined and all the court need do is employ
the judicial eraser to obliterate a mechanical or mathematical mistake,” it can be
conjured up.195 In other words, a “party or its legal representative” hoping to be
“relieve[d] . . . from a final judgment, order, or proceeding” must turn to Rule 60(b).196
Rule 60(a)’s province of review is exclusively limited to “clerical,” “copying,” or
“computational” mistakes,197 the rewriting of history beyond its narrowly bounded
reach.198 From its introduction, Rule 60(a) proved overwhelmingly satisfactory. 199
As composed, Rule 60(a) codifies no precise standard over what amounts to an
abuse of the discretion it furnishes. Responding to this dearth, courts have pinpointed
at least three judicial actions as incompatible with Rule 60(a)’s substantive
criterion,200 all three drawn from among the familiar panoply of prohibited juridical

192 FED. R. CIV. P. 60(a); see also Gonzalez v. Sec’y for Dep’t of Corr., 366 F.3d 1253, 1278
(11th Cir. 2004).
193 United States v. Kellogg (In re W. Tex. Mktg. Corp.), 12 F.3d 497, 504 (5th Cir. 1994).
194 Robi v. Five Platters, Inc., 918 F.2d 1439, 1445 (9th Cir. 1990).
195 In re W. Tex. Mktg. Corp., 12 F.3d at 504–05; see also, e.g., Bernstein v. LeFrake (In re
Frigitemp Corp.), 781 F.2d 324, 327 (2d Cir. 1986) (“The rationale for the provision that a
motion to correct a clerical error may be made ‘at any time’ is that the judgment simply has not
accurately reflected the way in which the rights and obligations of the parties have in fact been
adjudicated.”).
196 FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b); Anderson Living Tr. v. WPX Energy Prod., LLC, 308 F.R.D. 410,
427 (D.N.M. 2015); De Wit v. Firstar Corp., 904 F. Supp. 1476, 1496 (N.D. Iowa 1995).
197 Bowen Inv., Inc. v. Carneiro Donuts, Inc., 490 F.3d 27, 29 (1st Cir. 2007) (quoting In re
W. Tex. Mktg. Corp., 12 F.3d at 504–05); see also AngioDynamics, Inc. v. Biolitec AG, 880
F.3d 596, 599 (1st Cir. 2018) (quoting Bowen Inv., 490 F.3d at 29); Pfizer Inc. v. Uprichard,
422 F.3d 124, 129–30 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting, with approval, the standard for Rule 60(a)’s
permissible application articulated in In re W. Tex. Mktg. Corp., 12 F.3d at 504–05).
198 Vargas-Colon v. Hosp. Damas, Inc., 561 F. App’x 17, 21 (1st Cir. 2014) (relying on In
re W. Tex. Mktg. Corp., 12 F.3d at 504–05, for support).
199 Moore & Rogers, supra note 19, at 631.
200 James v. Jacobson, 6 F.3d 233, 239 (4th Cir. 1993); see also, e.g., McClure v. Ashcroft,
335 F.3d 404, 408 (5th Cir. 2003) (pointing to the three classic instances of abused discretion
by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in James, 6 F.3d at 239); Kern v.
TXO Prod. Corp., 738 F.2d 968, 970 (8th Cir. 1984) (pointing to the three classic instances of
abused discretion by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in James, 6 F.3d
at 239).
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acts already encompassed by “the familiar abuse of discretion standard”:201 (1) “an
exercise that is flawed by erroneous factual or legal premises”; 202 (2) “a failure or
refusal, either express or implicit, actually to exercise discretion, deciding instead as
if by general rule, or even arbitrarily, as if neither by rule nor discretion”; 203 or (3) a
“failure, in attempting to exercise discretion, adequately to take into account judicially
recognized factors constraining its exercise.” 204 Logically, because the timeliness of
the motion and nature of the discrepancy alleged necessarily affect the viability of any
Rule 60(a) motion,205 either a long (or short) lapse and a perceptibly clerical (or a
questionably computable) error indirectly influences the effective discretion actually
enjoyed by the seized court, raising (or lowering) their analytical burden. And, of
course, no review of a court’s discretionary decision under Rule 60(a) can be made
without proper fealty to its recognizable quiddity: that “the equitable goal of allowing
a party who has in fact established his right to relief to receive that relief” should
always outweigh “the goals of finality and repose.”206
b.

Rule 60(c)

Rule 60(c) specifies the temporal limitations on a party’s ability to turn to Rule
60(b).207 Namely, a motion for vacatur pursuant to any one of Rule 60(b)’s six
codified grounds must be made within “a reasonable time,” 208 a term inherently

201 James, 6 F.3d at 239; cf. United States v. Taylor, 487 U.S. 326, 336 (1988) (“Had
Congress merely committed the choice of remedy to the discretion of district courts, without
specifying factors to be considered, a district court would be expected to consider ‘all relevant
public and private interest factors,’ and to balance those factors reasonably.”).
202 James, 6 F.3d at 239; see also, e.g., United States v. Parker, 720 F. App’x 684, 689 (4th
Cir. 2018) (listing the ways in which a court could abuse its discretion); Gurmankin v. Costanzo,
626 F.2d 1115, 1119–20 (3d Cir. 1980) (listing the ways in which a court could abuse its
discretion).
203 James, 6 F.3d at 239; see also, e.g., United States v. Alvarado, 840 F.3d 184, 189 (4th
Cir. 2016) (citing James, 6 F.3d at 239).
204 James, 6 F.3d at 239; see also, e.g., Plaintiff B v. Francis, 631 F.3d 1310, 1316 (11th Cir.
2011) (citing the third); cf. Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1,
19 (1983) (“[A district court’s] discretion must be exercised under the relevant standard
prescribed by this court.”).
205 Bernstein v. LeFrake (In re Frigitemp Corp.), 781 F.2d 324, 327 (2d Cir. 1986); see also,
e.g., Bridgham by Libby v. Sec’y of the Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., 33 Fed. Cl. 101, 104
(1995) (citing In re Frigitemp Corp., 781 F.2d at 327).
206 In re Frigitemp Corp., 781 F.2d at 327.
207 United States v. 2002 Pontiac Bonneville SE, No. CIV 12-0580 JB/LFG, 2015 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 164738, at *16 (D.N.M. Dec. 7, 2015).
208 FED. R. CIV. P. 60(c)(1); Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. P’ship, 507
U.S. 380, 393 (1993); Ackermann v. United States, 340 U.S. 193, 197 (1950); Valadez v. Rydz,
319 F. App’x 423, 424–25 (7th Cir. 2008); Wesco Prods. Co. v. Alloy Auto. Co., 880 F.2d 981,
983 (7th Cir. 1989).
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subject to variable delineations,209 but does tender more precise deadlines for the
invocation of three of Rule 60(b)’s subsections. In particular, if Rule 60(b)(1), (2), and
(3) forms such a motion’s proposed basis, a hard one-year deadline “after the entry of
the judgment or order or the date of the proceeding” governs.210 In contrast, based not
on Rule 60(c)’s text but rather the kind of basis for vacatur codified in Rule
60(b)(4),211 motions based upon it can be brought at any time, whether reasonable or
not, whether before or after one year’s elapse.212 With Rule 60(b)(4) aside, even where
Rule 60(c)(1)’s stock deadline of one-year does not expressly apply, courts look upon
it as “at least probative of the general range of reasonable timeliness” for the
submission of any Rule 60(b) motion.213 Whenever made, however, a Rule 60(b)
“motion does not affect the judgment’s finality or suspend its operation,”214 and “does
not form part of the original action.”215
c.

Rule 60(d)

In the law’s patois, Rule 60(d) is known as Rule 60’s “savings clause,”216 partly
due to origins as the denominated “savings clause” of former Rule 60(b).217 As this
view intimates, relief under this provision “is reserved for cases of injustices which,
in certain instances, are deemed sufficiently gross to demand a departure from rigid
adherence to the doctrine of res judicata.”218 Unfettered by the one-year time limit
applicable to motions under Rule 60(b), Rule 60(d) preserves the district court’s once

209 See In re Old Carco LLC, 423 B.R. 40, 47 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010) (“A ‘reasonable time’
for a motion under Rule 60(b) for judicial error should be no greater than the time allowed to
file an appeal.”).
210 FED. R. CIV. P. 60(c)(1); Moses v. Joyner, 815 F.3d 163, 166 (4th Cir. 2016).
211 Carter v. Fenner, 136 F.3d 1000, 1006 (5th Cir. 1998); N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Brown, 84
F.3d 137, 142–43 (5th Cir. 1996); Orner v. Shalala, 30 F.3d 1307, 1310 (10th Cir. 1994).
212 Garcia Fin. Grp., Inc. v. Va. Accelerators Corp., 3 F. App’x 86, 88 (4th Cir. 2001);
V.T.A., Inc. v. Airco, Inc., 597 F.2d 220, 224 (10th Cir. 1979).
213 Macias v. N.M. Dep’t of Lab., 300 F.R.D. 529, 564 (D.N.M. 2014). A similar approach
characterizes the courts’ approach to Rule 45 and parts of the United State Code’s eleventh title.
In re Shelton Fed. Grp., LLC, No. 15-00623, 2017 Bankr. LEXIS 2519, at *4 (Bankr. D.D.C.,
Aug. 29, 2017).
214 FED. R. CIV. P. 60(c)(2); Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ill. v. Organon Teknika Corp. LLC,
614 F.3d 372, 375 (7th Cir. 2010).
215 Bryan v. Erie Cnty. Off. of Children & Youth, 752 F.3d 316, 321 (3d Cir. 2014).
216 Mitchell v. Rees, 651 F.3d 593, 595 (6th Cir. 2011).
217 See LinkCo, Inc. v. Akikusa, 615 F. Supp. 2d 130, 135 n.26 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (explaining
that “[p]rior to December 1, 2007, independent actions were brought under Rule 60(b)’s savings
clause instead of Rule 60(d)”); Addington v. Farmer’s Elevator Mut. Ins. Co., 650 F.2d 663,
667–68 (5th Cir. 1981); Bankers Mortg. Co. v. United States, 423 F.2d 73, 79 (5th Cir. 1970).
218 Park W. Galleries, Inc. v. Hochman, 692 F.3d 539, 545 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting United
States v. Beggerly, 524 U.S. 38, 46 (1998)) (internal quotation omitted).
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august inherent powers to: “(1) entertain an independent action to relieve a party from
a judgment, order, or proceeding; (2) grant relief under 28 U.S.C. § 1655 to a
defendant who was not personally notified of the action; or (3) set aside a judgment
for fraud on the court.”219
Each of these grounds has its own distinct requirements. In conclusively
unambiguous prose, Rule 60(d)(1) explicitly authorizes independent actions to set
aside a prior judgment,220 a prerogative only available upon decided demonstration of
five “indispensable” elements: (1) a judgment which ought not, in equity and good
conscience, to be enforced; (2) a good defense to the alleged cause of action on which
the judgment is founded; (3) fraud, accident, or mistake which prevented the defendant
in the judgment from obtaining the benefit of his defense; (4) the absence of fault or
negligence on the part of the defendant; and (5) the absence of any adequate remedy
at law.221 For its part, Rule 60(d)(3) authorizes the setting aside of “a judgment for
fraud on the court,”222 implicitly affording two bases for actions attacking judgments
more than one year old first articulated in 1878’s United States v. Throckmorton223
and 1944’s Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Company.224 Per the former,
that “extrinsic fraud, that is, fraud that was not the subject of the litigation, that infects
the actual judicial process, is grounds to set aside a judgment as procured by fraud”;
per the latter, a judgment may be attacked on the basis of intrinsic fraud that results
from corrupt conduct by officers of the court.225 As such, “fraud on the court,” as
contemplated by Rule 60(d)(3), exhibits a strikingly narrow scope, its relief typically
“reserved for circumstances in which, for example, a judge or a juror has been bribed,
a bogus document inserted in the record, or improper influence exerted upon the court
or an attorney so that the integrity of the court and its ability to function is directly
impinged.”226 In spite of this seemingly plain and cabined denotation, the difference
between fraud on the court and fraud relieved from by independent action has long

219 FED. R. CIV. P. 60(d)(1)–(3); see also Gillis v. Chase, 894 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 2018)
(explicating Rule 60(d)(1) and (3)).
220 FED. R. CIV. P. 60(d)(1); Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh Produce N.A., Inc., 741 F. 3d 1349,
1359 (11th Cir. 2014).
221 Barrett v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 840 F.2d 1259, 1263 (6th Cir. 1987); e.g.,
Aldana, 741 F. 3d at 1359.
222 FED. R. CIV. P. 60(d)(3). The second exception in Rule 60(d) deals with actions involving
liens affecting real property and lies outside the scope of this Article. FED. R. CIV. P. 60(d)(2).
223 United States v. Throckmorton, 98 U.S. 61, 68 (1878) (identifying extrinsic or collateral
fraud as a basis for setting aside judgment).
224 Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 239, 250–51 (1944) (setting
aside judgment where the successful litigant perpetuated fraud on the court).
225 Browning v. Navarro, 826 F.2d 335, 344 (5th Cir. 1987) (summarizing the holdings from
Throckmorton and Hazel-Atlas).
226 Morawski v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., No. 09-14568, 2010 WL 2663201, at *7 (E.D. Mich.
July 2, 2010) (relying on Great Coastal Express, Inc. v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 675 F.2d 1349,
1356 (4th Cir. 1982)).
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been rightfully scorned as ambiguous at best,227 a jurisprudential fact of some import
to Rule 60(b)(3)’s reach.228
C.

Return to Rule 60: The Lion’s Den of Rule 60(b)

With its drafters bereft of an adequate model in either the common law or equity
practice in matters of substance,229 Rule 60(b)’s first published iteration “suffered in
some respects from poor draftsmanship,”230 its two key provisions quickly proving
problematic.231 Most significantly, it allowed a court to provide relief “from a final
judgment, order, or proceeding” taken against him through his “mistake, inadvertence,
surprise, or excusable neglect.”232 It further swapped the finality imposed by the termrule with a six-month time limit on specific motions under Rule 60(b) for the
correction of judgments.233 In the years following its adoption, courts “sought to
finesse this new time limit”234 by, for example, relying on a now-defunct rule235 or
their inherent power.236 While most “refrained from these interpretive quirks as a
means of circumventing” Rule 60(b)’s substantive limitations, these and other
tribunals did opt to “read into the Rules the nebulous writs that had traditionally
provided post-term relief.”237 Judicial cacophony soon sounded, as “courts differed
over whether . . . [this provision] provided the exclusive means for obtaining [postjudgment] relief, or whether the writs that had been used prior to the adoption of the .
. . Rules still survived.”238 For all of the effort of Rule 60(b)’s first generation of
drafters, then, its original text yielded perplexing conflicts reminiscent of the common
law’s knottiness. Indeed, by the early 1940s, Rule 60(b) had already been loudly
critiqued for its inadequate scope and stringent time limitations. 239

227 Rule 60(b), supra note 117, at 79 n.17.
228 See infra Part II.C.3.a.
229 Moore & Rogers, supra note 19, at 631.
230 Comment, supra note 45, at 669.
231 Moore & Rogers, supra note 19, at 630–32.
232 FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(1).
233 Comment, supra note 45, at 668–69.
234 Rule 60(b), supra note 117, at 77–78.
235 Schram v. O’Connor, 2 F.R.D. 192, 193–94 (E.D. Mich. 1941) (discussing the rule of
enlargement, Rule 6(b), which provided for enlarging specified time periods). The original
textual support for this proposition came from Rule 6(b). See supra Part II.B.1.
236 Boaz v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 146 F.2d 321, 322 (8th Cir. 1944).
237 Rule 60(b), supra note 117, at 78.
238 United States v. Beggerly, 524 U.S. 38, 43–44 (1998).
239 Rule 60(b), supra note 117, at 78–79.
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Today’s Rule 60(b) reflects amendments, promulgated in 1947, to address these
varied problems. Structurally, its second cohort of authors grouped all methods of
relief from judgment within its four literal corners. Its language now made clear “that
nearly all of the old forms of obtaining relief from a judgment, i.e., coram nobis, coram
vobis, audita querela, bills of review, and bills in the nature of review, had been
abolished.”240 As to plaintiffs, Rule 60 retained “one of the old forms, i.e., the
‘independent action,’”241 as well as a proceeding to relief from fraud on the court,242
but from that overhaul until this very day, Rule 60(b) has served as “the only means
of obtaining relief from . . . [final] judgment[s]” for most civil parties in federal
court.243 Subject to a handful of exceptions, it amounts to “a rule of general
application, providing relief from all types of final judgments, including but not
limited to default judgments.”244 This revisionary power resides in the district court,
to be exercised in its “sound discretion”; thus, the denial of relief upon such motion is
only to be set aside on appeal for abuse of that expansive discretion.245 “[N]ot a
monolith” in its structure,246 however, Rule 60(b) does “‘not give courts unlimited
authority to fashion [such] relief as they deem appropriate.’” 247 Its framers, in fact,
set a “high[] value on the social interest in the finality of litigation,”248 as their
240 FED. R. CIV. P. 60(e); Beggerly, 524 U.S. at 45. See also, e.g., United States v. Torres,
282 F.3d 1241, 1245 n.6 (10th Cir. 2002) (noting that Rule 60(b) abolishes the writs of coram
nobis and audita querela); Angulo-Lopez v. United States, No. C05-483-RSM-JPD, 2005 WL
2206924, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 8, 2005) (“[A]mendments to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
60(b) expressly abolished all common law writs for civil cases, including audita querela.”).
241 Beggerly, 524 U.S. at 45; see also, e.g., T. Neal Combs, Note, Federal Rule 52(a) and
60(b)—A Chinese Puzzle, 21 SW. L.J. 339, 343–45 (1967) (precising Rule 60(b)’s history). An
example of such an action can be found in Pacific R.R. Co. v. Missouri Pacific Railway Co..
See generally Pac. R.R. of Miss. v. Miss. Pac. Ry. Co., 111 U.S. 505 (1884). Regardless, as the
Court explained, the independent action writ is now “reserved for those cases of injustices which
. . . are deemed sufficiently gross to demand a departure from rigid adherence to the doctrine of
res judicata.” Beggerly, 524 U.S. at 46 (quoting Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co.,
322 U.S. 238, 244 (1944)); see also, e.g., Hawkins v. Czarnecki, 42 F. App’x 785, 786 (6th Cir.
2002) (“While . . . [a federal] court has the authority to provide relief from judgment in an
independent action under the savings clause of Rule 60(b), this authority is extremely limited,
and an independent action is only available to prevent a grave miscarriage of justice.”).
242 Rule 60(b), supra note 117, at 79.
243 Porter v. Chi. Sch. Reform Bd. of Trs., 187 F.R.D. 563, 565 (N.D. Ill. 1999); see also
Beggerly, 524 U.S. at 45; Marcelli v. Walker, 313 F. App’x 839, 842 (6th Cir. 2009); Comput.
Leasco, Inc. v. NTP, Inc., 194 F. App’x 328, 334 (6th Cir. 2006).
244 Big Sky Music Co. v. George F. Mueller & Sons, Inc., No. 89 C 4163, 1990 WL 37711,
at *2 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 26, 1990).
245 Fackelman v. Bell, 564 F.2d 734, 736 (5th Cir. 1977).
246 Fisher v. Kadant, Inc., 589 F.3d 505, 512 (1st Cir. 2009).
247 Schultz v. Com. First Fin., 24 F.3d 1023, 1024 (8th Cir. 1994) (quoting Doe v.
Zimmerman, 869 F.2d 1126, 1128 (8th Cir. 1989)).
248 Merit Ins. Co. v. Leatherby Ins. Co., 714 F.2d 673, 682 (7th Cir. 1983).
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reexamination could “unfairly prejudice the opposing party” and endanger the equally
fervid “desirability of orderliness and predictability in the judicial process.” 249 A
motion under Rule 60(b) can therefore never serve as “a second opportunity for the
losing party to make its strongest case, to rehash arguments, or to dress up arguments
that previously failed,”250 with its ambit seen by the vast majority of courts as no
greater than that allowed for motions for reconsideration under Rule 59(e);251 it cannot
be, and never has been, “intended to be a substitute for a direct appeal.”252 Rather,
Rule 60(b) compels courts to balance the value of finality in litigation against the
worth of individual justice,253 the necessity of repose against the “incessant command
of the court’s conscience that justice be done in light of all of the facts,” in the course
of employing their generous discretion under Rule 60(b).254
Sanctioning two distinct procedures for obtaining relief from a final judgment,255
Rule 60(b)’s six enumerated grounds specify no more (and no less) than thirteen
different reasons for a judgment’s vacatur,256 each’s application necessitating the
striking of “[a] delicate balance between the sanctity of final judgments . . . and the
incessant command of [a] court’s conscience that justice be done in light of all the
facts.”257 In accordance with Rule 60(b), “[o]n motion and just terms, [a federal] court
may relieve a party or its legal representative from a final judgment, order, or
proceeding for” such reasons as “mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable

249 Fackelman, 564 F.2d at 736.
250 Scherer v. Hill, 213 F.R.D. 431, 432 (D. Kan. 2003).
251 Servants of the Paraclete v. Does, 204 F.3d 1005, 1012 (10th Cir. 2000); Abraham v.
WPX Energy Prod., LLC, 322 F.R.D. 592, 604 (D.N.M. 2017).
252 Cashner v. Freedom Stores, Inc., 98 F.3d 572, 576 (10th Cir. 1996); see also Cech v.
Crescent Hills Coal Co. (In re Shannopin Mining Co.), No. 96-2185, 2002 WL 31002883, at
*24–25 (W.D. Pa. July 25, 2002) (surveying the relevant jurisprudence).
253 Gilbert S. Rothenberg, Comment, The Assessment of Attorney’s Fees as a Condition to
the Setting Aside of Default Judgments, 24 AM. U. L. REV. 491, 494 (1975).
254 Seven Elves, Inc. v. Eskenazi, 635 F.2d 396, 401 (5th Cir. 1981); see also, e.g., Charter
Twp. of Muskegon v. City of Muskegon, 303 F.3d 755, 760 (6th Cir. 2002) (“The general
purpose of Rule 60(b) . . . is to strike a proper balance between the conflicting principles that
litigation must be brought to an end and that justice must be done.”); cf. Rogers v. Hartford Life
& Acc. Ins. Co., 167 F.3d 933, 938 (5th Cir. 1999) (“Courts construe Rule 60(b)(1) liberally to
ensure that they resolve doubtful cases on the merits.”).
255 Bankers Mortg. Co. v. United States, 423 F.2d 73, 77 (5th Cir. 1970).
256 See FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(1)–(6); cf. Hopkins v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re
Hopkins), Nos. 06-50684-SCS, APN 08-5012-SCS, 2009 WL 1789334, at *6–7 (Bankr. E.D.
Va. June 22, 2009) (listing all 13 bases).
257 Good Luck Nursing Home, Inc. v. Harris, 636 F.2d 572, 577 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (citing
Bankers, 423 F.2d at 77).
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neglect;” “the judgment is void;” or “any other reason that justifies relief.”258
Regardless of the specific paragraph invoked, Rule 60(b) generally empowers courts
to vacate judgments, including default judgments, whenever such action is appropriate
for, in the words of Rule 1, the “just . . . determination of . . . [any] action and
proceeding.”259
With courts and counsel pulled by the aforementioned principles in incompatible
directions, Rule 60(b)’s jurisprudence is a mess. Rule 60(b)(1), (2), and (4) have
provoked little interpretive fanfare and received relatively uniform construction; even
so, their plain prose has often begot debate worthy of notice. The same can be said,
albeit with far less confidence, as to Rule 60(b)(3) and Rule 60(b)(5), though reasons
for doubt about these provisions’ prevalent construction cannot be—yet regularly
are—overlooked. Whether inadvertently or not, however, Rule 60(b)(6) has been
subject to contrasting explications regularly ignored by courts and practitioners. As a
result, ambiguities regarding half of Rule 60(b) fester, propagating confusion over a
principle–finality—seen as crucial as to any judiciary’s long-term legitimacy.260
1.

Shared Concepts: A Liberal Approach and A Jurisdictional Quandary

Within decades of Rule 60(b)’s original enactment and first substantial
amendment, the courts developed two general rules-of-thumb to guide its
administration.261 First (and perhaps most importantly), court after court has seen
Rule 60(b) as mandating a liberal construction in accordance with the equitable
principles animating its formulation.262 In one opinion’s dated words, Rule 60(b)
“strongly indicates on its face that courts no longer are to be hemmed in by the
uncertain boundaries of these and other common law remedial tools,” 263 a verity
unchanged in the decades since that proclamation’s issuance. Hence, “the virtues of
finality,” the Honorable Antonin Scalia wrote in a dry matter-of-fact tone, remain a
“policy consideration [that], standing alone, is unpersuasive in the interpretation of a
provision whose whole purpose is to make an exception to finality.” 264 As for the
relevant equitable principles, that coterie includes the judiciary’s distaste for “the
extreme sanction of a default judgment”265 and modern federal procedure’s

258 FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(1), (4), (6); see Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 528 (2005)
(opining that Rule 60(b) establishes grounds for relief from a final judgment “under a limited
set of circumstances including fraud, mistake, and newly discovered evidence”).
259 Compton v. Alton S.S. Co., 608 F.2d 96, 101–02 (4th Cir. 1979); FED. R. CIV. P. 1.
260 Cf. Moore & Rogers, supra note 19, at 623–26 (discussing the importance of finality).
261 Clark, supra note 48, at 538–39.
262 Id. at 539.
263 Klapprott v. United States, 335 U.S. 601, 614 (1949).
264 Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 529 (2005).
265 Meehan v. Snow, 652 F.2d 274, 277 (2d Cir. 1981); Maggette v. Dalsheim, 709 F.2d 800,
803 (2d Cir. 1983); see also, e.g., Tazco, Inc. v. Dir., Off. of Workers Comp. Program, U.S.
Dep’t of Lab., 895 F.2d 949, 950 (4th Cir. 1990) (“The law disfavors default judgments as a
general matter.” (citing Augusta Fiberglass Coatings, Inc. v. Fodor Contracting Corp., 843 F.2d
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preference for trials on the merits,266 “particularly when the case presents issues of
fact.”267 Second, this same judicial majority has rejected assigning any weight to a
motion’s nomenclature, as equity can justify.268 Within the whole of this murky
jurisprudence, “[t]he manner in which the relief is requested and the nomenclature
used” is simply treated as “not significant.”269
Even as the aforesaid tenets consolidated their foothold, a circuit split emerged,
and likely remains, as to an issue relevant to that entire subsection’s application:
whether a court may invoke it sua sponte.270 As written, Rule 60(b) states that “[o]n
motion and just terms, the court may relieve a party or its legal representative from a
final judgment . . . ,”271 but omits any reference to the movant’s identity,272 in decided
contrast with Rule 60(a), which then allowed for correction “by the court at any time
of its own initiative or on the motion of any party . . . .”273 A minimum of two circuits
have held that the subject of “on motion” in Rule 60(b) refers to the party alone;
accordingly, they have held this provision to require a motion from the affected
party.274 Unpersuaded by these courts’ reasoning, at least six others have treated the
phrase “on motion” as a general grant of authority, “nothing forbid[ding] the court to
grant such relief.”275 Problematically, in the years since the majority of these opinions
808, 811 (4th Cir. 1988))); Augusta Fiberglass Coatings, Inc., 843 F.2d at 810 (“[W]here default
judgments are at issue, over the years this court has taken an increasingly liberal view of Rule
60(b) which indicates that a reversal is warranted under the present circumstances.”); accord,
e.g., Davis v. Musler, 713 F.2d 907, 916 (2d Cir. 1983); United States v. Moradi, 673 F.2d 727–
28 (4th Cir. 1982); see also, e.g., Macias v. Ocean Quest, No. 93-1517, 1993 WL 386311, at *2
(E.D. La. Sept. 17, 1993) (citing Meehan, 652 F.2d at 277).
266 E.g., Beitel v. OCA, Inc. (In re OCA, Inc.), 551 F.3d 359, 366 n.6 (5th Cir. 2008) (quoting
United States v. One Parcel of Real Prop., 763 F.2d 181, 183 (5th Cir. 1985)); Whelan v. Abell,
48 F.3d 1247, 1258 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (quoting Keegel v. Key West & Caribbean Trading Co.,
627 F.2d 372, 373–74 (D.C. Cir. 1980)); Medunic v. Lederer, 533 F.2d 891, 893–94 (3d Cir.
1976).
267 Meehan, 652 F.2d at 277.
268 United States v. Jacobs, 298 F.2d 469, 472 (4th Cir. 1961).
269 Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Guerra, 582 P.2d 819 (N.M. 1978) (construing the identically
worded New Mexico version of Rule 60(b)), quoted in Barker v. Barker, 608 P.2d 138, 142
(N.M. 1980).
270 Henry Brownstein, Note, Rule 60(b): A Rule Suitable for a Sua Sponte Motion, 15 B.U.
PUB. INT. L.J. 152, 155 (2005). Brownstein, supra note 270, at 155–57.
271 FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b).
272 Ransom v. Nationstar Mortg. LLC, No. PX 15-1647, 2016 WL 7474533, at *1 (D. Md.
Dec. 29, 2016); Brownstein, supra note 270, at 155–57.
273 FED. R. CIV. P. 60(a).
274 United States v. Pauley, 321 F.3d 578, 581 (6th Cir. 2003); Eaton v. Jamrog, 984 F.2d
760, 762 (6th Cir. 1993); Dow v. Baird, 389 F.2d 882, 884–85 (10th Cir. 1968).
275 Pierson v. Dormire, 484 F.3d 486, 491 (8th Cir. 2007); Fort Knox Music, Inc. v. Baptiste,
257 F.3d 108, 111 (2d Cir. 2001); Kingvision Pay-Per-View Ltd. v. Lake Alice Bar, 168 F.3d
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were issued, Rule 60(a) has been revised so as to allow a court to grant relief “on
motion or on its own,” the phrases “at any time of its own initiative” (as to court) and
“of any party” (as to motion) now deleted.276 Due to this relatively recent change,
whether “good reason” to reconsider these conflicted opinions exists is a question only
one appellate panel has deigned to mention,277 an interpretive uncertainty worsened
by intra-circuit omissions.278
2.

The Relatively Plain Trio: Rule 60(b)(1), (2), and (4)
a.

Rule 60(b)(1)

Rule 60(b)(1) allows for relief for “mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable
neglect.”279 Courts called upon to determine whether this Rule 60(b)(1) governs
usually consider: (1) whether the moving party has a meritorious defense; (2) whether
that person acted with reasonable promptness upon receiving notice of their default;
(3) the prejudice likely to be suffered by both the non-moving and moving party; and
any (4) “exceptional circumstances.”280 When assessing the last element, tribunals
sometimes look at: (i) whether the moving party had a history of dilatory action; (ii)
the extent to which other sanctions less drastic than a default judgment can be
assessed; and (iii) the degree to which the defaulting party bears blame for the default
effectuated—and whether something more nefarious than negligence lay behind its
mistake.281 As a practical matter, jurisprudence reveals only two instances in which
motions under Rule 60(b)(1) have consistently educed favorable consideration: “(1)
when the party has made an excusable litigation mistake or an attorney in the litigation
has acted without authority; or (2) when the judge has made a substantive mistake of
law or fact in the final judgment or order.”282
As delineated within this body of law, several axioms cabin Rule 60(b)(1)’s
effective extent. While courts once read Rule 60(b)(1) as encompassing only mistakes

347, 352 (9th Cir. 1999); Simer v. Rios, 661 F.2d 655, 663 n.18 (7th Cir. 1981); McDowell v.
Celebrezze, 310 F.2d 43, 44 (5th Cir. 1962); United States v. Jacobs, 298 F.2d 469, 472 (4th
Cir. 1961); Ray v. United States, 121 F.2d 416, 418 (7th Cir. 1941).
276 FED. R. CIV. P. 60(a).
277 Van Cannon v. United States, 890 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 2018).
278 Judson Atkinson Candies, Inc. v. Latini-Hohberger Dhimantec, 529 F.3d 371, 385 (7th
Cir. 2008) (discussing the circuit split but overlooking Ray or Simer).
279 FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(1); McCain v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re McCain), 353 B.R.
452, 462 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2006).
280 Danielson v. Human, 676 F. App’x 198, 199 (4th Cir. 2017).
281 Payne ex rel. Estate of Calzada v. Brake, 439 F.3d 198, 204–05 (4th Cir. 2006).
282 E.g., Yapp v. Excel Corp., 186 F.3d 1222, 1231 (10th Cir. 1999); Cashner v. Freedom
Stores, 98 F.3d 572, 576 (10th Cir. 1996); Bey v. Iaquinto, No. 12 Civ. 5875(JCF), 2016 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 15720, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 4, 2016) (quoting Yapp, 186 F.3d at 1231).
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of fact, not law,283 certain types of judicial mistakes do presently fall within its
definite, if more pliable, boundaries.284 A bit of textual rejiggering explains this shift:
while earlier versions of Rule 60(b)(1) had limited mistake to mistake of a party, that
restrictive qualification was removed in 1948.285 Even today, however, inadvertence,
ignorance of the rules, or mistakes construing such procedural precepts rarely suffice
as evidence of excusable neglect,286 as “the kinds of mistakes remediable under a Rule
60(b)(1) motion are litigation mistakes that a party could not have protected against,
such as counsel acting without authority.”287 In fact, even where cognizable mistakes
can be alleged, the moving party must normally establish why he or she was justified
in failing to avoid its occurrence if relying upon Rule 60(b)(1)’s first three stated
grounds;288 accordingly, “[c]arelessness by a litigant or his counsel does not afford a
basis for relief under Rule 60(b)(1).”289 In some courts, “[t]he ‘excusable neglect’
clause” alone “is interpreted as encompassing errors made due to the ‘mere neglect’
of the petitioner . . . .”290 Relatedly, though several circuits allow parties to challenge
the legal correctness of a judgment under this rule, this prerogative persists “only
where the motion is filed before the time for appeal has run.”291
As the foregoing amply evidences, plain simple mistake forms the only proper
premise for every Rule 60(b)(1) motion and decision.292 Accordingly, “relief from a
judgment of default” under Rule 60(b)(1) is often granted whenever “the defaulting
party acts with reasonable diligence in seeking to set aside the default and tenders a
meritorious defense.”293 Courts, in turn, exclusively limit Rule 60(b)(1) to correcting
“minor errors reflecting the[ir] actual intent”294 and “obvious errors of law, apparent

283 Torrington Co. v. Loc. Union 590 of Int’l Union, United Auto., 803 F.2d 927, 931 (7th
Cir. 1986); McKnight v. U.S. Steel Corp., 726 F.2d 333, 338 (7th Cir. 1984).
284 Cashner, 98 F.3d at 576–78.
285 FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b) advisory committee’s note to 1946 amendment.
286 Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. P’ship, 507 U.S. 380, 391–92 (1993).
287 Yapp, 186 F.3d at 1231; see also Cashner, 98 F.3d at 577.
288 Park Corp. v. Lexington Ins. Co., 812 F.2d 894, 896 (4th Cir. 1987); McCain v. Educ.
Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re McCain), 353 B.R. 452, 461 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2006).
289 Pelican Prod. Corp. v. Marino, 893 F.2d 1143, 1146 (10th Cir. 1990) (citing Ben Sager
Chems. Int’l, Inc. v. E. Targosz & Co., 560 F.2d 805, 809 (7th Cir.1977)).
290 Cmty. Dental Servs. v. Tani, 282 F.3d 1164, 1170 n.11 (9th Cir. 2002).
291 Van Skiver v. United States, 952 F.2d 1241, 1244 (10th Cir. 1991).
292 Yapp, 186 F.3d at 1231.
293 United States v. Moradi, 673 F.2d 725, 727 (4th Cir. 1982); see also, e.g., Consol.
Masonry & Fireproofing, Inc. v. Wagman Constr. Corp., 383 F.2d 249, 251 (4th Cir. 1967)
(honoring this approach).
294 Rooney v. Biomet, Inc., 197 F.R.D. 209, 211 (D. Mass. 2000) (relying on Buggs v. Elgin,
Joliet & E. Ry. Co., 852 F.2d 318, 322 (7th Cir. 1988)).
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on the record,”295 reading its text to authorize no more than the “perfunctory
correction” of glaring factual and legal blunders.296 Whatever doubts may have once
enfeebled Rule 60(b)(1), its interpretation has reached a mostly static state.
b.

Rule 60(b)(2)

Rule 60(b)(2) predicates vacatur on “newly discovered evidence that, with
reasonable diligence, could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial
under Rule 59(b).”297 To satisfy this provision, a typical movant must satisfy a popular
five-part test:
(1) the evidence must be newly discovered since the trial; (2) due diligence
on the part of the movant to discover the new evidence must be shown; (3)
the evidence must not be merely cumulative or impeaching; (4) the evidence
must be material; and (5) the evidence must be such that a new trial would
probably produce a new result.298
A showing of “potential significance” will almost never do;299 “[r]ather, relief from
order will only be granted if the evidence would have changed the result.” 300 In
addition, no demonstration of reasonable diligence can usually be made if the “new
evidence” sat, even if unknown, in the movant’s theoretical possession throughout the
relevant time period.301 Some circuits recognize a grudging exception to this rule,
reasonable diligence still found if the aggrieved party was “excusably ignorant” of the
new information at the time of trial.302 Highlighting Rule 60(b)(2)’s comparatively

295 Van Skiver, 952 F.2d at 1244.
296 See Alvestad v. Monsanto Co., 671 F.2d 908, 913 (5th Cir. 1982) (saying so as to errors
of law only); see also Compton v. Alton S.S. Co., 608 F.2d 96, 104 (4th Cir. 1976) (awarding
relief where mistake was “plain misconstruction” of a statute); Rocky Mountain Tool & Mach.
Co. v. Tecon Corp., 371 F.2d 589, 596–97 (10th Cir. 1966) (holding that “palpably erroneous
award” of interest from date of filing counterclaim rather than from date of entry of judgment
correctable under Rule 60(b)(1)).
297 FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(2); Meineker v. Hoyts Cinemas Corp., 325 F. Supp. 2d 157, 159
(N.D.N.Y. 2004).
298 Toole v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 235 F.3d 1307, 1316 (11th Cir. 2000) (citing Scutieri
v. Paige, 808 F.2d 785, 793 (11th Cir. 1987)). Some courts group the same requirements under
three rather than five headings. Compass Tech., Inc. v. Tseng Labs., Inc., 71 F.3d 1125, 1130
(3d Cir. 1995).
299 Plisco v. Union R.R., 379 F.2d 15, 16 (3d Cir. 1967). See also, e.g., Bohus v. Beloff, 950
F.2d 919, 930 (3d Cir. 1991) (citing Pilsco, 379 F.2d at 16); Chang v. City of Albany, 150
F.R.D. 456, 361 (N.D.N.Y. 1993) (citing Pilsco, 379 F.2d at 16).
300 SB Liquidation Tr. v. Preferred Bank (In re Syntax-Brillian Corp.), Nos. 08-11407 (BLS),
10-51389, 2013 Bankr. LEXIS 194, at *23–24 (Bankr. D. Del. Jan. 15, 2013).
301 E.g., Atkinson v. Prudential Prop. Co., 43 F.3d 367, 371 n.3 (8th Cir. 1994); Taylor v.
Texgas Corp., 831 F.2d 255, 259 (11th Cir. 1987).
302 Plisco, 379 F.2d at 16.
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uniform construction and attendant appeal, its standard, as encoded and construed, has
migrated into yet other codes.303
c.

Rule 60(b)(4)

As the last of Rule 60(b)’s relatively uncontroversial bases for relief, Rule 60(b)(4)
allows for vacatur if a “judgment is void.”304 As logic would lead one to expect, no
time limitation applies to a Rule 60(b)(4) motion precisely because such a defect goes
to the heart of any court’s authority.305 By law, a judgment bears that irremediable
defect “if the court which rendered it lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter, or of
the parties, or acted in a manner inconsistent with due process of law.”306 For example,
any judgment, whether by default or not, is irreparably “void for lack of personal
jurisdiction over the defendant where service of process was not properly effected.”307
Hence, a default judgment entered against an improperly served party which never
received actual notice must always fall under Rule 60(b)(4).308 As any void judgment
is regarded as a “legal nullity,” no other result could be justified, even in the absence
of Rule 60(b)(4).309
Beyond such “rare instance[s]” of inherent invalidity, Rule 60(b)(4) is toothless.
Thus, no judgment can be attacked via Rule 60(b)(4) even if it is clearly “erroneous”
or “based upon precedent which is later deemed incorrect or unconstitutional.”310
Similarly, Rule 60(b)(4) cannot be exploited so as to undermine voidable

303 1 FED. R. CRIM. P. 33; see also, e.g., United States v. Davis, 15 F.3d 526, 531 (6th Cir.
1994) (explicating Rule 33).
304 FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(4); see also, e.g., Garcia Fin. Grp., Inc. v. Va. Accelerators Corp., 3
F. App’x 86, 88 (4th Cir. 2001); Hawkins v. MV Transp., Inc., No. PJM 15-2169, 2017 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 194736, at *9 (D. Md. Nov. 27, 2017) (“[A] ‘movant claiming relief under Rule
60(b)(4) need not establish a meritorious defense.’” (quoting Bd. of Trs. of the Int’l Union of
Operating Eng’rs, Local 37 Benefit Funds v. Chesapeake Crane Serv., Inc., No. GLR-13-1245,
2016 WL 1253285, at *1 (D. Md. Mar. 30, 2016))).
305 Garcia Fin. Grp., Inc., 3 F. App’x at 89 n.3. Accord Orner v. Shalala, 30 F.3d 1307, 1310
(10th Cir. 1994); Bd. of Trs. of the Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs, Local 37 Benefits Funds,
2016 WL 1253285, at *1 n.2.
306 In re Four Seasons Sec. Laws Litig., 502 F.2d 834, 842 (10th Cir. 1974); Inland Concrete
Enters. v. Kraft, 318 F.R.D. 383, 410 (C.D. Cal. 2016).
307 Sartor v. Toussaint, 70 F. App’x 11, 13 (2d Cir. 2002) (citing, among other authorities,
Peralta v. Heights Med. Ctr., Inc., 485 U.S. 80, 84–87 (1988)).
308 Armco, Inc. v. Penrod-Stauffer Bldg. Sys., 733 F.2d 1087, 1089 (4th cir. 1984); see also,
e.g., Relational, LLC v. Hodges, 627 F.3d 668, 671 (7th Cir. 2010) (“[A] judgment is void as to
any party who was not adequately served.”); Miner v. Punch, 838 F.2d 1407, 1410 (5th Cir.
1988) (“There being no valid service of process, the default judgment . . . is an absolute nullity
and must be vacated.” (citing Aetna Bus. Credit, Inc. v. Universal Decor & Interior Design, Inc.,
635 F.2d 434, 435 (5th Cir. 1981))).
309 See Meyers v. Hansen, 221 P.3d 81 (Idaho 2009) (“‘[V]oid judgments can be attacked at
any time.’” (quoting Burns v. Baldwin, 65 P.3d 502, 508 (Idaho 2003))).
310 Marshall v. Bd. of Educ., 575 F.2d 417, 441 (3d Cir. 1978).
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judgments,311 an admittedly fluid category,312 whose review is usually reserved for
Rule 60(b)(6) by judicial predilection more than anything.313 A judgment must be
void, “not merely voidable,” to qualify under the former, no judgment void merely
due to one or more errors’ conspicuousness.314 With the perquisites for a void
judgment well-established, Rule 60(b)(4) retains much potency solely within its
limited domain, neither its doctrinal core nor its occasional permutations triggering
vociferous and intractable debate.
3.

The Nebulous Trio: Rule 60(b)(3), (5), and (6)
a.

The Ill-Defined Third: Rule 60(b)(3)

Rule 60(b)(3) looks to the existence of “fraud (whether previously called intrinsic
or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party.” 315 More
substantively, this paragraph “clearly requires the moving party to ‘show that the
adverse party committed a deliberate act that adversely impacted the fairness of the
relevant legal proceeding [in] question,’”316 for subsection (b)(3) is “aimed at
judgments which were unfairly obtained, not at those which are factually
incorrect.”317 Put differently, “[t]he conduct complained of must be tantamount to
preventing the losing party from fully and fairly presenting his defense” for Rule
60(b)(3) to apply.318 Distilled, Rule 60(b)(3) imposes two broad stipulations on its
use: the moving party must prove “by clear and convincing evidence” that (1) “the
adverse party obtained the [judgment] through fraud, misrepresentations, or other

311 Solano v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, No. 2:17-cv-05253 JFW-PJW, 2017 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 222508, at *10 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 16, 2017).
312 Cf. Ball v. United States, 163 U.S. 662, 669–70 (1896) (holding that if a court has
jurisdiction of the cause and the party, its judgment is not void, but only voidable).
313 See Citizens Bank v. Parnes, 376 F. App’x 496, 506–07 (6th Cir. 2010) (surveying case
law as to whether failure to provide notice under Rule 55(b)(2) renders a judgment void or
voidable).
314 Hudson v. Shapiro, 917 A.2d 77, 82 (D.C. 2007) (citing Jones v. Hersh, 845 A.2d 541,
544–45 (D.C. App. 2004)) (construing that jurisdiction’s identical Superior Court Civil Rule
60(b)(4)).
315 FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(3); Halliburton Energy Servs. v. NL Indus., 618 F. Supp. 2d 614,
642 (S.D. Tex. 2009) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(3)).
316 Info-Hold, Inc. v. Sound Merch., Inc., 538 F.3d 448, 455 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting Jordan
v. Paccar, Inc., No. 95–3478, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 35358, at *17 (6th Cir. Sept. 17, 1996));
see also, e.g., Woodworker’s Supply Inc. v. Principal Mut. Life Ins. Co., 170 F.3d 985, 993
(10th Cir. 1999) (emphasizing the need for proof of substantial interference).
317 Rozier v. Ford Motor Co., 573 F.2d 1332, 1339 (5th Cir. 1978); see also Zurich N. Am.
v. Matrix Serv., 426 F.3d 1281, 1290 (10th Cir. 2005) (quoting Rozier, 573 F.2d at 1339).
318 Scutieri v. Paige, 808 F.2d 785, 794 (11th Cir. 1987); accord Waddell v. Henry Cnty.
Sheriff’s Office, 329 F.3d 1300, 1309 (11th Cir. 2003).
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misconduct;”319 and (2) “the conduct prevented the losing party from fully and fairly
presenting his case or defense.”320
b.

The More Enigmatic Fifth: Rule 60(b)(5)

If “the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged;” “is based on an earlier
judgment that has been reversed or vacated;” or “applying it prospectively is no longer
equitable,” Rule 60(b)(5) may be invoked.321 Seemingly, “[m]ost of the cases where
relief was granted [under Rule 60(b)(5)] based on satisfaction of the judgment
involved monetary judgments or conditional injunctions,” 322 and this particular
provision has been most frequently invoked so as to “prevent the plaintiff from
obtaining a windfall by collecting more than the amount actually due on account of a
particular judgment, such as when it may have been paid or satisfied by someone else
or a single judgment has been entered against multiple defendants.” 323 As a practical
matter, then, this first clause of Rule 60(b)(5) provides a defendant with an essential
remedy whenever “the holder of . . . [a] judgment refuses to acknowledge that it has
been satisfied or to file a satisfaction of judgment.”324 For Rule 60(b)(5)’s second
clause to be applicable, the judgment at issue must have been explicitly and directly
based on a prior judgment subsequently reversed or vacated,325 with most appellate
courts restricting its application to “cases in which the present judgment is ‘based on’
the prior judgment in the sense of res judicata or collateral estoppel.”326 Less tightly
circumscribed, the third ground for invalidity in Rule 60(b)(5) has frequently been
used so as to provide relief from permanent injunctions, including when a change of
law or behavior renders the continuance of an injunction strikingly inequitable.327 For

319 Waddell v. Hemerson, 329 F.3d 1300, 1309 (11th Cir. 2003).
320 Frederick v. Kirby Tankships, Inc., 205 F.3d 1277, 1287 (11th Cir. 2000).
321 FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(5); see Horne v. Flores, 557 U.S. 433 (2009) (stressing the
disjunctive nature of Rule 60(b)(5)).
322 In re Jacobs, No. 05-19032, 2008 Bankr. LEXIS 3611, at *9 (Bankr. D. Kan. Sept. 22,
2008).
323 Kleven v. Mrozinski (In re Mrozinski), 489 B.R. 818, 821 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 2013) (citing,
as examples, AIG Baker Sterling Heights, LLC v. Am. Multi-Cinema, Inc., 579 F.3d 1268, 1272
(11th Cir. 2009), and Landau & Cleary, Ltd. v. Hribar Trucking, Inc., 867 F.2d 996, 1001 (7th
Cir. 1989), among others).
324 In re Mrozinski, 489 B.R. at 821.
325 Lubben v. Selective Serv. Sys. Local Bd., 453 F.2d 645, 650 (1st Cir. 1972);
Nulankeyutmonen Nkihtaqmikon v. BIA, 601 F. Supp. 2d 337, 339 (D. Me. 2009); see also,
e.g., Bailey v. Ryan Stevedoring, Inc., 894 F.2d 157, 160 (5th Cir. 1990) (noting that Rule
60(b)(5) does not contemplate relief based merely upon precedential evolution); Tomlin v.
McDaniel, 865 F.2d 209, 211 (9th Cir. 1989) (noting that Rule 60(b)(5) does not contemplate
relief based merely upon precedential evolution).
326 Schwartz v. United States, 129 F.R.D. 117, 121 (D. Md. 1990) (citing Berryhill v. United
States, 199 F.2d 217, 219 (6th Cir. 1952)).
327 L.J. v. Wilbon, 633 F.3d 297, 305–06 (4th Cir. 2011) (construing Horne).
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instance, this clause of Rule 60(b)(5) has been repeatedly seen as the appropriate
vehicle through which one defendant may seek credit against all or part of a judgment
for the amount paid by a settling co-defendant.328 As case law amply attests,
regardless of the particular prong invoked, Rule 60(b)(5) regularly forms “the basis
for a motion to correct”329 and relieve a party for a judgment no longer justified by
“changing conduct or conditions.”330
c.

The Protean Sixth: Rule 60(b)(6)

Controversial from its birth,331 Rule 60(b)(6) affords a reprieve for “any other
reason that justifies” it.332 As courts have continually averred, relief under this catchall provision constitutes “an [especially] extraordinary remedy.”333 Indeed, Rule
60(b)(6) has been characterized as “a grand reservoir of equitable power to do justice
in a particular case,”334 conferring “broad discretion on the trial court to grant relief
when appropriate to accomplish justice”335 and properly “utilized only where
extraordinary circumstances prevented a party from taking timely action to prevent or
correct an erroneous judgment.”336 Nonetheless, at least two related precepts delimit
the true degree of discretion bequeathed by this amorphous provision. First, Rule

328 BUC Int’l Corp. v. Int’l Yacht Council Ltd., 517 F.3d 1271, 1274 (11th Cir. 2008).
329 Torres-Troche v. Yauco, 873 F.2d 499, 502 n.7 (1st Cir. 1989).
330 Twelve John Does v. District of Columbia, 841 F.2d 1133, 1139 (D.C. Cir. 1988); see
also, e.g., Lepore v. Ramsey, 149 F.R.D. 90, 93 (D. Md. 1993) (explicating the standard for
determining whether an order or judgment has prospective application within the meaning of
Rule 60(b)(5), as set forth in Twelve John Does, 841 F.2d at 1138–39, and applied in Schwartz,
129 F.R.D. at 121–22).
331 Mary Kay Kane, Relief from Federal Judgments: A Morass Unrelieved by a Rule, 30
HASTINGS L.J. 41, 41 (1978).
332 FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(6); accord Searles v. Dechant, 393 F.3d 1126, 1131 (10th Cir. 2004)
(stressing this provision’s breadth).
333 Merit Ins. Co. v. Leatherby Ins. Co., 714 F.2d 673, 682 (7th Cir. 1983); accord Reform
Party of Allegheny Cnty. v. Allegheny Cnty. Dep’t of Elections, 174 F.3d 305, 311 (3d Cir.
1999) (holding that relief is only available in extraordinary circumstances).
334 Hesling v. CSX Transp., Inc., 396 F.3d 632, 642 (5th Cir. 2005) (quoting Harrell v. DCS
Equip. Leasing Corp., 951 F.2d 1453, 1458 (5th Cir.1992)); see also Pierce v. Cook & Co., 518
F.2d 720, 722 (10th Cir. 1975) (citations omitted).
335 Pichardo v. Ashcroft, 374 F.3d 46, 55 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting Matarese v. LeFevre, 801
F.2d 98, 106 (2d Cir. 1986)); see also Van Skiver v. United States, 952 F.2d 1241, 1245 (10th
Cir. 1991) (stressing Rule 60(b)(6)’s reach as limited to “unusual circumstances”). Perhaps for
this reason, courts weighing whether to grant relief from a judgment on the basis of a change in
law once heavily relied upon this paragraph. Richard M. Lipton, Comment, Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 60(b): Standards for Relief from Judgments Due to Changes in Law, 43 U. CHI.
L. REV. 646, 647 (1976).
336 United States v. Washington, 394 F.3d 1152, 1157 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting United States
v. Alpine Land & Reservoir Co., 984 F.2d 1047, 1049 (9th Cir. 1993)).
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60(b)(6) may only be used when no other subsection is available;337 second, no motion
made pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6) can be predicated on the same reasons advanced so as
to procure relief under Rule 60(b)(1)–(5).338 For all the behavioral curbs imposed by
these firmly ensconced maxims, Rule 60(b)(6) remains “the most textually enigmatic
of the six reasons for relief contained in Rule 60(b).”339
III. A KALEIDOSCOPE OF INTERPRETIVE DEFECTS: RULE 60(B)(3), (5), AND (6)’S
DETRITUS
A.

Overview of the Interpretive Principles

As with statutes, any federal rule’s terms are “give[n] . . . their plain meaning”340
and “read in . . . [their] proper context.”341 With due obedience accorded to the old
rules of English grammar,342 courts first utilize semantic rules343 and syntactic
canons,344 the language of the relevant provision and the terms and the structure of

337 Pioneer Inv. Serves. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. P’ship, 507 U.S. 380, 393 (1993);
Lyon v. Agusta S.P.A., 252 F.3d 1078, 1088–89 (9th Cir. 2001); Nemaizer v. Baker, 793 F.2d
58, 63 (2d Cir. 1986).
338 Pedroza v. No Lomas Auto Mall, Inc., 304 F.R.D. 307, 329–30 (D.N.M. 2014); Hechinger
Liquidation Tr. v. Spectrum Grp., Inc. (In re Hechinger Inv. Co. of Del., Inc.), 309 B.R. 706,
709 (Bankr. D. Del. 2004); Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 863 n.11
(1988) (concluding, based on the logic of Klapprott v. United States, 335 U.S. 601, 613 (1949),
that clause (6) and clauses (1) through (5) of Rule 60(b) are mutually exclusive).
339 Meadows, supra note 188, at 999.
340 Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Ent. Grp., 493 U.S. 120, 123 (1989) (as to the Civil Rules);
see also, e.g., Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 687 (1988) (applying plain meaning
paradigm to Evidence Rules); Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 163 (1988)
(applying plain meaning paradigm to Evidence Rules); Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171,
178–79 (1987) (adhering to the plain meaning of Evidence Rule 104 despite its inconsistency
with prior practice); United States v. Freedman, 688 F.2d 1364, 1366 (11th Cir. 1982)
(extending doctrine to construction of Criminal Rules).
341 McCarthy v. Bronson, 500 U.S. 136, 139 (1991).
342 Cf. United States v. Ron Pair Enters., 489 U.S. 235, 241–42 (1989) (finding support for
a particular reading in the statute’s “grammatical structure”); DiFiore v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 561
F. Supp. 2d 131, 135 (D. Mass. 2008) (applying basic rules of grammar to interpret of the
statutory term “service charge”).
343 See, e.g., State v. C.M., 154 So. 3d 1177, 1180 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015) (quoting
ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS
(2012) (defining the “Omitted-Case Canon” as “meaning ‘nothing is to be added to what the
text states or reasonably implies’”)); Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local #111 v. Pub. Serv. Co.
of Colo., 773 F.3d 1100, 1108 (10th Cir. 2014) (“Under [the ordinary-meaning] canon, if
context indicates that words bear a technical legal meaning, they are to be understood in that
sense.”).
344 See, e.g., City of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakima Indian Nation, 502
U.S. 251, 262 (1992) (“[A] proviso can only operate within the reach of the principal provision
it modifies,” encapsulating the proviso canon); Lary v. Trinity Physician Fin. & Ins. Servs., 780
F.3d 1101, 1105–06 (11th Cir. 2015) (“Ordinarily, the scope of a subpart is limited to that
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the pertinent section and statute finely deconstructed. Of course, these linguistic
canons’ utility sharply varies, each one’s pertinence effectively demarcated by a bevy
of related contextual tenets,345 most especially the whole text canon.346 In this first
stage of a most “holistic endeavor,”347 courts strive to divine ambiguity and plainness
with these defined tools, always paying attention “to the language itself, the specific
context in which that language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a
whole.”348 Even in the most stringent forms of textual interpretation, statutory milieu
therefore matters. After all,
[a] provision that may seem ambiguous in isolation is often clarified by the
remainder of the statutory scheme — because the same terminology is used
elsewhere in a context that makes its meaning clear . . . or because only one
of the permissible meanings produces a substantive effect that is compatible
with the rest of the law.349

subpart.”); United States v. Laraneta, 700 F.3d 983, 989 (7th Cir. 2012) (defining the “lastantecedent” canon as “say[ing] that a qualification in the last term of a series should be confined
to that term” and the “series-qualifier canon” as “provid[ing] that a modifier at the beginning or
end of a series of terms modifies all the terms”); In re Sanders, 551 F.3d 397, 399 (6th Cir.
2008) (describing the nearest reasonable referent canon, closely related to the last antecedent
canon, as requiring that “[w]hen a word such as a pronoun points back to an antecedent or some
other referent, the true referent should generally be the closest appropriate word”).
345 United States v. Castleman, 572 U.S. 157, 174 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
concurring in judgment) (“[Per] the presumption of consistent usage[,] . . . a term generally
means the same thing each time it is used.”); RadLax Gateway Hotel LLC v. Amalgamated
Bank, 566 U.S. 639, 645 (2012) (“[I]t is a commonplace of statutory construction that the
specific governs the general.”); Ali v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 552 U.S. 214, 230 (2008) (“The
ejusdem generis canon provides that, where a seemingly broad clause constitutes a residual
phrase, it must be controlled by, and defined with reference to, the ‘enumerated categories . . .
which are recited just before it,’ so that the clause encompasses only objects similar in nature.”);
Fla. Dep’t of Revenue v. Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc., 554 U.S. 33, 47 (2008) (“[S]tatutory titles
and section headings ‘are tools available for the resolution of a doubt about the meaning of a
statute.”’); Sachs v. Republic of Austria, 737 F.3d 584, 598 n.13 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing for
support to “the harmonious reading canon,” “the provisions of a text should be interpreted in a
way that renders them compatible, not contradictory,” and “the associated words canon,”
“associated words bear on one another's meaning”); cf. Amoco Prod. Co. v. Watson, 410 F.3d
722, 734 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (“No canon of construction justifies construing the actual statutory
language beyond what the terms can reasonably bear.”).
346 SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 343, at § 25.
347 United Sav. Ass’n of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., 484 U.S. 365, 371
(1988).
348 Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341 (1997); L.S. Starrett Co. v. Fed. Energy
Regul. Comm’n, 650 F.3d 19, 25 (1st Cir. 2011).
349 United Sav. Ass’n of Tex., 484 U.S. at 371 (internal citation omitted); see also, e.g.,
Roberts v. Sea-Land Servs. Inc., 566 U.S. 93, 101 (2012) (“It is a fundamental canon of statutory
construction that the words of a statute must be read in their context and with a view to their
place in the overall statutory scheme.”).
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Overall, this approach makes much of such contextual and textual evidence350 and
examines the statute’s overarching architecture for clarification and circumstantial
reference when necessary.351 If this process yields a single denotation and
connotation,352 the provision in question is unambiguous and plain,353 usually
controlling unless an exception applies.354 In the interpretive exercise subject to these
tenets, plain and unambiguous meaning arises from more than just the enacted text
contextually illuminated,355 courts heavily reliant on “ordinary, contemporary,
common meaning[s],”356 “obvious and dominating general purpose,”357 and a term’s
“placement.”358 Albeit other rules can and do play divergent roles,359 these canons
tend to star.360

350 United States v. Campbell, 798 F. Supp. 2d 293, 302 (D.D.C. 2011).
351 United States v. McLemore, 28 F.3d 1160, 1162 (11th Cir. 1994); see also, e.g., K Mart
Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 291 (1988) (“In ascertaining the plain meaning of the
statute, the court must look to the particular statutory language at issue, as well as the language
and design of the statute as a whole.”).
352 See In re Asher, 488 B.R. 58, 64 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2013) (“Ambiguity only exists so long
as several plausible interpretations of the same statutory text, specific and different in substance,
can be advanced.”).
353 Yates v. United States, 574 U.S. 528, 537, 563–64 (2015).
354 See Amir Shachmurove, Purchasing Claims and Changing Votes: Establishing “Cause”
under Rule 3018(a), 89 AM. BANKR. L.J. 514, 530–31 (2015) [hereinafter Shachmurove,
Claims] (enumerating this quintet, including the rule against absurdity and the scrivener’s error).
355 See, e.g., King v. St. Vincent’s Hosp., 502 U.S. 215, 221 (1991) (“[T]he meaning of
statutory language, plain or not, depends on context.”); United States v. Hartwell, 73 U.S. (6
Wall.) 385, 396 (1867) (“The proper course in all cases is to adopt that sense of the words which
best harmonizes with the context, and promotes in the fullest manner the policy and objects of
the legislature . . . . [T]he words should be taken in such a sense, bent neither one way nor the
other, as will best manifest the legislative intent.”); New Castle County v. Hartford Acc. &
Indem. Co., 970 F.2d 1267, 1270 (3d Cir. 1992) (“[T]he question is not whether there is an
ambiguity in the metaphysical sense, but whether the language has only one reasonable meaning
when construed, not in a hypertechnical fashion, but in an ordinary, common sense manner.”).
356 Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979); see also, e.g., United States v. Haun, 494
F.3d 1006, 1009 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting Perrin, 444 U.S. at 42).
357 Miller v. Amusement Enters., Inc., 394 F.2d 342, 350 (5th Cir. 1968); United States v.
DuBose, 598 F.3d 726, 731 (11th Cir. 2010).
358 Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 145 (1995) superseded by statute, Crimes and
Criminal Procedure, ch. 44, 112 Stat. 2681–528 (1998) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)),
unrelated purpose of citation, as stated in Welch v. United States, 578 U.S. 120, 133 (2016).
359 See infra Part III.B.2–3.
360 See Amir Shachmurove, Sovereign Speech in Troubled Times: Prosecutorial Statements
as Extrajudicial Admissions, 86 TENN. L REV. 401, 464–65 (2019) [hereinafter Shachmurove,
Speech] (discussing maxims’ saliency and their relevant exceptions).
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Often treated as one such syntactic canon is the principle of trans-substantivity.361
More accurately labeled a “theory,” this tenet directs courts to interpret any federal
rule such that they apply neutrally across substantive contexts.362 This principle
provides several discrete benefits, including “protect[ing] process law against
distortion otherwise produced by outsized political influence, capture, or bias” and
“lower[ing] the barriers to entry for areas of practice.”363 Arguably, interpretation
itself has become “an inherently trans-substantive task, to the extent that it provides
rules of grammar and usage to help vest the incomplete or indeterminate use of
language with meaning.”364 Though this theorem has come under increasing pressure
in recent decades,365 on top of trenchant academic criticism,366 it retains its status as
an interpretive touchstone,367 the corollary of the Court’s longstanding admonition
that, except where doing so would “produce absurd results,” words and phrases in the
Rules “must . . . be read in pari materia . . . .”368
B.

Application: Rule 60(b)’s Violations of Well-Established Interpretive
Principles
1.

Rule 60(b)(3)

Two issues tend to complicate Rule 60(b)(3)’s efficacy as a tool of review. True,
neither has dogged Rule 60(b)(3)’s effectiveness to any great degree. Nonetheless,
both exemplify, on a smaller and more manageable scale, the defective tendencies
hobbling the utility of Rule 60(b)(5) and (6): above all, a willingness to reject or
overlook a “straightforward interpretation of . . . [its] text.”369

361 Id. at 468; David Marcus, Institutions and an Interpretive Methodology for The Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 927, 968 (2011).
362 Shachmurove, Claims, supra note 354, at 532–33.
363 David Marcus, Trans-Substantivity and the Processes of American Law, 2013 BYU L.
REV. 1191, 1220–21 (2013).
364 Id. at 1208.
365 David Marcus, The Past, Present, and Future of Trans-Substantivity in Federal Civil
Procedure, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 371, 375 (2010); Carl Tobias, The Transformation of TransSubstantivity, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1501, 1504–08 (1992).
366 Linda S. Mullenix, Hope Over Experience: Mandatory Informal Discovery and the
Politics of Rulemaking, 69 N.C. L. REV. 795 (1991); Gene R. Shreve, Eighteen Feet of Clay:
Thoughts on Phantom Rule 4(m), 67 IND. L.J. 85 (1991).
367 Shachmurove, Speech, supra note 360, at 468; cf. Suzette Malveaux, A Diamond in the
Rough: Trans-Substantivity of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Its Detrimental Impact
on Civil Rights, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 456, 518–25 (2015) (attempting to “re-legitimize” this
doctrine).
368 Yousuf v. Samantar, 451 F.3d 248, 256 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, 21 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting)).
369 Jordan v. Paccar, Inc., No. 95-3478, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 25358, at *17 (6th Cir. Sept.
17, 1996); see also, e.g., Venture Indus. Corp. v. Autoliv ASP, Inc., 457 F.3d 1322, 1332–33
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The first issue is lexicographical: “[N]either the rule itself nor its official
commentary provide a specific definition of ‘fraud.’”370 Without any hint of
ambiguity, Rule 60(b)(3) compels the moving party to “show that the adverse party
committed a deliberate act that adversely impacted the fairness of the relevant legal
proceeding [in] question”; fraud, after all, “cannot be unintentional.”371 Yet, what
kind of balefulness encompassed by the mutable term “fraud” must actually be
demonstrated remains textually indeterminate.372 Admittedly, common practice hints
at some essential character, as “fraud on the court, whatever else it embodies,”
normally “requires a showing that one has acted with an intent to deceive or defraud
the court.”373 “Thus, when there is no intent to deceive, the fact that
misrepresentations were made to a court is not of itself a sufficient basis for setting
aside a judgment under the guise of ‘fraud on the court.”374 Even a failure to disclose
requested information during discovery may constitute misconduct under Rule
60(b)(3), at least so long as a violation of a specific discovery request or order can be
shown.375 Under this precedent, “a non-reckless mistake” will not suffice, with Rule
60(b)(3) suggesting a requirement of some odious behavior on the part of the nonmoving party.376 Still, this plain reading has been disavowed, at one point or another,
by at least three appellate courts377 in spite of the Court’s unambiguous disapproval
of such creativity.378
Rule 60(b)(3)’s second recognizable glitch reflects a particular doctrine’s
persistence, more than any textual misapprehension. Rule 60(b) expressly dispenses
(Fed. Cir. 2006) (commending Jordan for its “thorough analysis of the language of the rule and
its treatment by other circuits” and adopting its approach).
370 Info-Hold, Inc. v. Sound Merch., Inc., 538 F.3d 448, 455 (6th Cir. 2008).
371 Jordan, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 25358, at *17.
372 Info-Hold, Inc., 538 F.3d at 455.
373 Robinson v. Audi Aktiengesellschaft, 56 F.3d 1259, 1267 (10th Cir. 1995).
374 Id. Rule 60(b) conceivably authorizes two other avenues for relief due to the effectuation
of fraud upon the court. United States v. Buck, 281 F.3d 1336, 1341 (10th Cir. 2002).
375 Zurich N. Am. v. Matrix Serv., 426 F.3d 1281, 1292 (10th Cir. 2006); see also Cummings
v. Gen. Motors Corp., 365 F.3d 944, 955–56 (10th Cir. 2004) (finding no such violation and
thus denying relief under Rule 60(b)(3)).
376 Cummings, 365 F.3d at 955–56.
377 Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc., 862 F.2d 910, 923 (1st Cir. 1988) (“‘Misconduct’ does not
demand proof of nefarious intent or purpose as a prerequisite to redress . . . . The term can cover
even accidental omissions-elsewise it would be [superfluous], because ‘fraud’ and
‘misrepresentation’ would subsume it.”); United States v. One Douglas A-26B Aircraft, 662
F.2d 1372, 1374 n.6 (11th Cir. 1981) (explaining, to avoid redundancy, “misrepresentation” in
Rule 60(b)(3) must encompass more than false statements made with the intent to deceive);
Bros, Inc. v. W. E. Grace Mfg. Co., 351 F.2d 208, 211 (5th Cir. 1965) (providing relief on the
ground of “other misconduct” can be justified “whether there was evil, innocent or careless,
[sic] purpose”).
378 Bus. Guides v. Chromatic Commc’ns Enters., 498 U.S. 533, 540–41 (1991).
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with the distinction between extrinsic and intrinsic fraud for claims, colorfully derided
as “shadowy, uncertain, and somewhat arbitrary” by one state supreme court prior to
World War I,379 brought within one year from the entry of judgment under Rule
60(b).380 In a most unfortunate evolution, the “troublesome and unsound
distinction”381 between extrinsic and intrinsic fraud, formally preserved due to its
incorporation via Rule 60(d),382 revealingly mars Rule 60(b)(3)’s helter-skelter
jurisprudence.383 Aside from this unfortunate doctrinal verity, however, this fealty to
a historical approach, explicitly disavowed by Rule 60(b)(3)’s text and implicitly
disdained by its initial authors, reveals a seeming willingness to reconstruct the
common law’s byzantine pathways, without regard to both the underlying purposes of
Rule 60(b) and the three aims sanctified by Rule 1.384 Simply put, the courts have
muddled, rather than simplified, Rule 60(b)’s third basis for post-judgment relief.
2.

Rule 60(b)(5)

To a more perilous degree, the problems endemic to Rule 60(b)(5)’s construction
arise from the same incessant predisposition applied to Rule 60(b)(3): the habitual
failure of courts to clearly distinguish amongst its three grounds and unambiguously
specify the particular clause justifying relief in an ever-increasing cavalcade of
modern rulings.
Much of these errata trace to Rule 60(b)(5)’s first stated ground—that a judgment
has been “satisfied, released or discharged” language—the subject of ruinously breezy
analyses.385 Without a smidgen of doubt, as a multitude of cases have acknowledged,
parties’ usage of Rule 60(b)(5) and, therefore, courts’ most common exegesis of this
paragraph have been based primarily on its third subsection, the one dealing with the
inequity of prospective application.386 As a result, case law discussing the “satisfied,
released or discharged” language under Rule 60(b)(5) can be damned for its

379 Howard v. Scott, 125 S.W. 1158, 1166 (Mo. 1910).
380 Id. at 1161.
381 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 134, § 2861.
382 See supra Part II.B.4.c.
383 Cf. Mr. G v. Mrs. G, 465 S.E.2d 101, 107 (S.C. Ct. App. 1995) (Hearn, J., dissenting)
(arguing that there is “no reason” that this distinction “should survive in an independent action,
particularly in view of subsection (5) of Rule 60(b) which extends relief to actions brought
outside the one year period,” in construing South Carolina’s identical version).
384 James Wm. Moore & Elizabeth B.A. Rogers, Federal Relief from Civil Judgments, 55
YALE L.J. 623, 629–31 (1946).
385 FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(5).
386 Id.; e.g., Travelers Indem. Co. v. Sarkisian, 794 F.2d 754, 757 n.4 (2d Cir. 1986); United
States v. Ga. Power Co., 634 F.2d 929 (5th Cir. 1981).
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sparsity,387 this rare reliance upon it by courts or parties amplifying the ambiguity
surrounding its essential ambit.388 Substantively, even though it poses little difficulty
to discern whether payment or a certain condition has been met, the sole condition
undoubtedly imposed by the plain language from Rule 60(b)(5), courts remain wary
of its explication. For example, despite a steady cascade of cases, it remains
profoundly unclear whether a discharge in bankruptcy may constitute Rule 60(b)(5)
grounds for relief from judgment.389 Instead, courts have noticed a pattern—“[m]ost
of the cases where relief was granted based on satisfaction of the judgment involved
monetary judgments or conditional injunctions”390—and converted it into a binding
axiom without regard to its three verbs’ plain meaning and Rule 60(b)’s embedded
purpose. The natural import of language that could reach far beyond these two types
of judgment has, in effect, been clipped due to judicial tentativeness, but it is the
ascertainment and application of such plain meaning to which every court must
dedicate itself.391 For such somnolent efforts, the law’s regnant interpretive scheme
has little patience,392 regardless of the result’s correctness.393
Though it has been subject to more judicial exposition, precedent has similarly
limited Rule 60(b)(5)’s “reversed or otherwise vacated” basis for relief via an
unnecessarily cabined construal.394 For the majority of courts forced to peruse this
provision, and willing to do so with the requisite care, its language only encompasses
judgments directly related to a prior decision by both the precise parties and the
relevant claims. 395 Yet, this construal effectively treats those four words as
incorporating the same test commonly utilized for claim preclusion,396 as that doctrine

387 In re Christensen, No. 09-20299-PRW, 2015 Bankr. LEXIS 3506, at *10 (Bankr.
W.D.N.Y. Oct. 16, 2015); In re Mrozinski, 489 B.R. 818, 821 n.1 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 2013);
United States v. Am. Nat’l Bank & Tr. Co., 101 F.R.D. 770, 771 (N.D. Ill. 1984).
388 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 134, § 2863.
389 See BayBank v. Sullivan, 1998 Mass. App. Div. 112, 113 (Mass. Dist. Ct. 1998)
(recognizing this possibility under the analogous state law rule).
390 In re Jacobs, No. 05-19032, 2008 Bankr. LEXIS 3611, at *10 (Bankr. D. Kan. Sept. 22,
2008).
391 Pavelic & Leflore v. Marvel Ent. Grp., 493 U.S. 120, 123 (1989).
392 See supra Part III.A.
393 Cent. Tr. Co. v. Off. Creditors’ Comm. of Geiger Enters., Inc., 454 U.S. 354, 360 (1982)
(per curiam) (“While the Court of Appeals may have reached a practical result, it was a result
inconsistent with the unambiguous language used by Congress.”).
394 Lipton, supra note 340, at 653–64.
395 See supra Part II.C.4.b.
396 Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 718 F.3d 460, 467 (5th Cir. 2013) (enumerating four
commonly utilized factors: “(1) the parties are identical or in privity; (2) the judgment in the
prior action was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction; (3) the prior action was
concluded by a final judgment on the merits; and (4) the same claim or cause of action was
involved in both actions”). Traditionally, courts use the phrase “res judicata” to refer to claim
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invariably “prohibits successive litigation of the very same claim by the same
parties.”397 As written, Rule 60(b)(5)’s second state ground imposes no such
congruence condition so as to render it applicable only to direct reversal, likely on
appeal, of a prior judgment.398 Indeed, to read it so is to render the “otherwise vacated”
portion of this subsection impermissibly superfluous.399 While extrinsic evidence can
surely help clarify the ambiguous, no such support for this unduly circumscribed
construction can be credibly posited, for none exists. Indeed, courts still regularly
parrot the narrow interpretation of Rule 60(b)(5)’s “based on” phrase without
bothering to propound any underlying rationale,400 even though several, including the
desire to protect finality of judgments,401 can be posited.
These gaps have led to perhaps the most surprising aspect of Rule 60(b)(5)’s
modern construction. Reasonably read and weighed, its plain terms suggest that it
could provide relief in the event of a judicial change of law;402 customarily, such a
plain interpretation cannot be set aside but for the most pressing reasons.403 Yet, court
after court continues to blithely ignore its text’s probable import404 and consign this

preclusion, and “collateral estoppel” to refer to issue preclusion. See, e.g., Taylor v. Sturgell,
553 U.S. 880, 892 n.5 (2008); Berríos v. Gonzalez-Rosario, 630 F.3d 7, 11 n.5 (1st Cir. 2010).
397 Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 579 U.S. 582, 599 (2016) (citing New Hampshire
v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 748 (2001)).
398 FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(5).
399 See Negonsott v. Samuels, 507 U.S. 99, 104 (1993) (referring to the court’s duty to “give
effect to the will of Congress, and where its will has been expressed in reasonably plain terms,
that language must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive”) (quoting Griffin v. Oceanic
Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 570 (1982)); see, e.g., Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88, 101 (2004)
(asserting that the court must follow “the cardinal rule that statutory language must be read in
context [since] a phrase gathers meaning from the words around it”) (quoting Gen. Dynamics
Land Sys. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 596 (2004)); Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Solimino,
501 U.S. 104, 112 (1991) (“But of course we construe statutes, where possible, so as to avoid
rendering superfluous any parts thereof.”).
400 Lubben v. Selective Serv. Syst. Loc. Bd., 453 F.2d 645, 650 (1st Cir. 1971); Berryhill v.
United States, 199 F.2d 217, 219 (6th Cir. 1952); see also Comment, Pierce v. Cook & Co.:
Change in State Law as a Ground for Relief from a Federal Judgment, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 843,
850–51 (1976) (adopting the narrow construction favored in Moore’s preeminent treatise).
401 See Berryhill, 199 F.2d at 219 (implicitly stressing this concern).
402 Lipton, supra note 340, at 664.
403 Shachmurove, Claims, supra note 354, at 530–31.
404 See, e.g., Berryhill, 199 F.2d 217 at 219 (“Certainly it was not the purpose of [Rule
60(b)(5)] to permit a final judgment to be set aside whenever thereafter any case from another
jurisdiction involving the same question and decided the same way is later reversed by an
Appellate Court.”); Morgan v. United States, No. 7:05-cv-00224, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
100380, at *2 (W.D. Va. Jan. 31, 2006) (“Discovery of new or additional case law is not a
proper ground for relief from judgment under Rule 60(b).”).
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ground to the province of the infinitely more inexplicit Rule 60(b)(6).405 Of course,
as one would expect in light of Rule 60(b)(5)’s open-ended text, discord reigns even
here.406 Admittedly, the decision to reference “equity” in Rule 60(b)(5) probably
ensured this dissonance’s perpetuity, but surely not its defensibility. Rather, if Rule
60(b)(5), like every other rule, must be construed so as “to secure the just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of every action”407—and, indeed, it must408—this
dissonance need end.
3.

Rule 60(b)(6)

Bereft of meaningful textual guidance far more than Rule 60(b)(5), Rule 60(b)(6)
is today weighed down by its own cadre of interpretive mistakes.
First, though construed to compel relief only in “extraordinary circumstances” by
most courts,409 that same requirement for exceptional circumstances has occasionally
been imputed to the whole of Rule 60(b).410 For example, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has repeatedly observed: “Generally, Rule 60(b)
provides for extraordinary relief, which may be granted only upon a showing of
exceptional circumstances.”411 Other courts have used the same formulation.412 In

405 See, e.g., Dowell v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Auto. Ins. Co., 774 F. Supp. 996, 999 (S.D.
W. Va. 1991) (“[I]t is well settled that a change of law after a judgment has become final is not
a sufficient basis for vacating the judgment.”).
406 See Travelers Indem. Co. v. Sarkisian, 794 F.2d 754, 757 n.4 (2d Cir. 1986) (“A change
in decisional law is cognizable under Rule 60(b)(5).”).
407 FED. R. CIV. P. 1.
408 Mickalis Pawn Shop, LLC v. Bloomberg, 465 F. Supp. 2d 543, 545–46 (D.S.C. 2006).
409 See, e.g., Nash v. Hepp, 740 F.3d 1075, 1078 (7th Cir. 2014) (“[A] change in law . . .
showing a previous judgment may have been incorrect is not an extraordinary circumstance
justifying relief under Rule 60(b)(6).”); Adams v. Thaler, 679 F.3d 312, 319 (5th Cir. 2012)
(finding Fifth Circuit precedents hold a change in decisional law after entry of judgment does
not constitute exceptional circumstances under Rule 60(b)(6)); United States v. Alpine Land &
Reservoir Co., 984 F.2d 1047, 1049 (9th Cir. 1993) (observing that Rule 60(b)(6) is to be used
“sparingly as an equitable remedy to prevent manifest injustice . . . [and] only where
extraordinary circumstances prevented a party from taking timely action to prevent or correct
an erroneous judgment”); Cooper v. Bell, No. 1:03-cv-276, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47465, at
*14–17 (E.D. Tenn. Apr. 7, 2014) (collecting cases declining to treat a change in law as an
“extraordinary circumstance” for purposes of Rule 60(b)(6)).
410 United States v. Tracts 10 & 11 of Lakeview Heights, 51 F.3d 117, 120 (8th Cir. 1995)
(“A district court should grant a Rule 60(b) motion ‘only upon an adequate showing of
exceptional circumstances.’”) (quoting United States v. Young, 806 F.2d 805, 806 (8th Cir.
1986)).
411 Mitchell v. Shalala, 48 F.3d 1039, 1041 (8th Cir. 1995); see also, e.g., Atkinson v.
Prudential Prop. Co., 43 F.3d 367, 371 (8th Cir. 1994); Young, 806 F.2d at 806.
412 See, e.g., Fisher v. Kadant, Inc., 589 F.3d 505, 512 (1st Cir. 2009) (“A party seeking relief
under Rule 60(b) must demonstrate ‘at a bare minimum,’ . . . that [among other things,]
exceptional circumstances exist.”) (quoting Karak v. Burshal Oil Corp., 288 F.3d 15, 19 (1st
Cir. 2002)); Cashner v. Freedom Stores, 98 F.3d 572, 576 (10th Cir. 1996) (“‘[R]elief under
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effect, these courts treat Rule 60(b) as necessitating the same threshold showing for
purposes of Rule 60(b)(1)–(5) as the more narrowly tailored Rule 60(b)(6) specifically
compels. Albeit this conflation is the product of interpretation, it renders the analysis
mandated by the latter duplicative of the one presumptively compelled by the
former,413 interjecting confusion as to the distinction amongst Rule 60(b)’s six
provisions.414 For this confused state, the Court seemingly bears much blame,415 as it
first imposed this non-textual requirement unto the body of Rule 60(b) as a whole.416
Even so, the operative text of either Rule 60(b) or Rule 60(b)(6) says no such thing,
this a-textual construction is inconsistent with Rule 60(b)’s history and purpose and
thus contrary to its specific context.417
Second, courts continue to squabble over the proper analytical paradigm to be
applied upon Rule 60(b)(6)’s specific invocation.418 As one circuit has explicitly
established, a movant seeking to meet Rule 60(b)(6) must show: “(1) good cause for
the default; (2) quick action to correct the default; and (3) the existence of a
meritorious defense to the original action.”419 In at least three others, however, Rule

Rule 60(b) is extraordinary and may only be granted in exceptional circumstances.’”) (quoting
Bud Brooks Trucking, Inc. v. Bill Hodges Trucking Co., 909 F.2d 1437, 1440 (10th Cir. 1990));
Thompson v. Thi of N.M. at Casa Arena Blanca, LLC, No. 05-1331 JB/LCS, 2008 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 108726, at *35 (D.N.M. Dec. 24, 2008) (“Rule 60(b) is an extraordinary form of
relief.”).
413 Cf. De Wit v. Firstar Corp., 904 F. Supp. 1476, 1496 (N.D. Iowa 1995) (“This standard
of requiring ‘exceptional circumstances’ in order to provide relief applies even to motions
brought on the ‘catch-all’ ground found in Rule 60(b)(6) . . . .”).
414 Indeed, despite Young, the Eighth Circuit later stressed Rule 60(b)(6)’s “exceptional
circumstance” element. Atkinson, 43 F.3d at 373.
415 See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 535, 538 (2005) (holding that Rule 60(b)(6) is
available only in “extraordinary circumstances”).
416 Ackermann v. United States, 340 U.S. 193, 199 (1950); see also, e.g., Liljeberg v. Health
Servs. Acquisition, Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 863–64 n.11 (1988) (explicating this history); Scott
Dodson, Rethinking Extraordinary Circumstances, 106 NW. L. REV. 377, 378 (2012)
(explicating this history).
417 Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341 (1997) (“The plainness or ambiguity of
statutory language is determined by reference to the language itself, the specific context in
which the language is used, and the broader context of the statute of a whole.”); Bosamia v.
Comm’r, 661 F.3d 250, 255–56 (5th Cir. 2011) (analyzing a statute’s purpose as part of its
specific context); United States v. Ramos, 537 F.3d 439, 462–63 (5th Cir. 2008) (analyzing a
statute’s purpose as part of its specific context).
418 Compare United States v. 8136 S. Dobson St., 125 F.3d 1076, 1083 (7th Cir. 1997)
(analyzing movant’s Rule 60(b)(6) motion under a three-part test), with Cmty. Dental Servs. v.
Tani, 282 F.3d 1164, 1168 (9th Cir. 2002) (explaining that under Rule 60(b)(6) a movant “must
demonstrate both injury and circumstances beyond his control that prevented from proceeding
with the prosecution or defense of the action in a proper fashion”).
419 8136 S. Dobson St., 125 F.3d at 1083 (quoting United States v. Indoor Cultivation Equip.
from High Tech Indoor Garden Supply 55 F.3d 1311, 1313 (7th Cir. 1995)).
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60(b)(1), not Rule 60(b)(6), looks to this trio.420 In the words of one similarly
convinced court, once a defendant proves “mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or
excusable neglect” they should naturally be permitted to “satisfy the other two factors:
the existence of a meritorious defense and the absence of substantial prejudice to the
plaintiff should relief be granted.”421 Dispensing with this pastiche entirely, a third
predicates relief under the latter upon a showing of “both injury and circumstances
beyond [the] control [of the moving party] that prevented him from proceeding with
[the prosecution or defense of] the action in a proper fashion.”422 The merger of Rule
60(b)’s seemingly generalized “extraordinary circumstances” test with Rule
60(b)(6)’s identically described lodestar, one abetted by the Court, may explain this
persistent variability.423 Whatever its causal reason, however, the absence of any
definite test has fostered the kind of anarchy begat by the writs at their worst424—and
incompatible with the intent of Rule 60(b)’s second generation of drafters to abolish,
among others, the “writs of coram nobis, coram vobis, and audita querela” in the
interest of the common law’s demystification.425 Thus, although Rule 60(b) was
revised in 1948 to more completely “define the practice with respect to any existing
rights or remedies to obtain relief from final judgments,”426 this persistent pattern
takes its language of Rule 60(b)(6) as a license for concocting other remedies or
culling the extant ones. No recognizable axiom of interpretation, only a stultifying
caution, can justify such an approach, as Rule 60(b)’s first sets of authors intended to

420 United States v. Timbers Pres., 999 F.2d 452, 454 (10th Cir. 1993); Sawyer v. USAA Ins.
Co., 839 F. Supp. 2d 1189, 1219 (D.N.M. 2012). Two more circuits appear to endorse this
construal. E.g., Waifersong, Ltd. v. Classical Music Vending, 976 F.2d 290, 292–93 (6th Cir.
1992); Action S.A. v. Marc Rich & Co., 951 F.2d 504, 508 (2d Cir. 1991); Davis v. Musler, 713
F.2d 907, 915 (2d Cir. 1983).
421 Widmer-Baum v. Chandler-Halford, 162 F.R.D. 545, 552–53 (N.D. Iowa 1995) (quoting
Waifersong, Ltd., 976 F.2d at 292–93).
422 Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v. Int’l Fibercom, Inc. (In re Int’l Fibercom, Inc.), 503 F.3d 933, 941
(9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Tani, 2823 F.3d at 1168); Alpine Land & Reservoir Co., 984 F.2d at
1049; Phuong Doan v. Astrue, No. 04cv2039 J (RBB), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39290, at *12–
13 (S.D. Cal. May 13, 2008) (quoting Tani, 2823 F.3d at 1168).
423 See Gregorian v. Izvestia, 658 F. Supp. 1224, 1237 (C.D. Cal. 1987) (considering these
three factors under Rule 60(b)(6), in a strange reliance on an opinion centered on Rule 60(b)
more generally in Pena v. Seguros La Comercial, S.A., 770 F.2d 811, 815 (Cir. 1985)); cf. Big
Sky Music Co. v. George F. Mueller & Sons, Inc., No. 89 C 4163, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3271,
at *4–5 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 26, 1990) (“Exceptional circumstances warranting relief [under Rule
60(b) generally] are present only where the movant can demonstrate (1) good cause for the
relief, (2) quick action to obtain it, and (3) a meritorious claim or defense in the underlying
action.” (citing Elec. Mfg. Co. v. Toronado Sys. of Am., 687 F.2d 182, 185 (7th Cir. 1985))).
424 See supra Part II.A.
425 FED. R. CIV. P. 60(e) (emphasis added).
426 FED. R. CIV. P. 60 advisory committee’s note to 1946 amendment (emphasis added).
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allow for a cabined evolution in accordance with its complete text, 427 not a return to
the writs’ chaotic last decades of existence.428
Finally, even where the same yardstick controls this issue’s adjudication, what
circumstances warrant the label of “exceptional” induces recurrent juridical
clashes.429 For example, in Massachusetts, a lawyer’s gross negligence and
inexcusable conduct does not justify relief under the Bay State’s identical state version
of Rule 60(b)(6).430 A federal court within the jurisdiction of that state’s federal
appellate circuit harped upon “the general rule . . . that a party which voluntarily
chooses his attorney as his representative in an action, cannot avoid the consequences
of the acts or omissions of his freely selected agent” reached the same conclusion,
even as it recognized the possibility of finding otherwise “where an attorney’s
mishandling of a movant’s case stems from . . . [a] mental illness.” 431 As it noted,
“‘[v]isiting the sins of the attorney . . . on the client is of course inherent in the nature
of the adversary system,’” that circuit’s regnant rule.432 In contrast, a number of
federal courts have granted relief from default judgments in such circumstances,
relying on such policy considerations as the remedial nature of Rule 60(b), the
judiciary’s partiality for decisions on the merits, and the interests of unblinkered
justice.433
IV. CONCLUSION
Before the Rules’ adoption, federal courts utilized a kaleidoscope of common law
remedial devices in the effort to balance the need to rectify unjust judgments and to
ensure finality in litigation.434 In 1938, Rule 60(b) replaced this patchwork with
specific procedures and precise limitations. 435 However, in light of the courts’
continued invocation of their inherent powers, Rule 60(b)(6) was added in 1948.436
427 See supra Part II.C.
428 See supra Part II.A. According to the Court, the commentary authored by the men who
crafted the original Federal Rules of Evidence “disclose a purpose to adhere to the common law
in the application of evidentiary principles, absent express provisions to the contrary.” Tome v.
United States, 513 U.S. 150, 160–61 (1995) (plurality opinion). This conclusion is, in important
particulars, deeply flawed. See generally Shachmurove, Speech, supra note 360.
429 Cmty. Dental Servs. v. Tani, 282 F.3d 1164, 1169 (9th Cir. 2002).
430 Morse v. Livable Decores, Inc., No. 06-P-224, 2006 Mass. App. Unpub. LEXIS 91, at *3
(Mass. App. Ct. Dec. 20, 2006).
431 Cruz v. Mun. of Dorado, 780 F. Supp. 2d 157, 160 (D.P.R. 2011).
432 Vallejo v. Santini-Padilla, 607 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2010) (quoting Figueroa Ruiz v. Alegria,
896 F.2d 645, 650 n.5 (1st Cir. 1990)).
433 Tani, 282 F.3d at 1169–70; L.P. Steuart, Inc. v. Matthews, 329 F.2d 234, 235–36 (D.C.
1964).
434 Rule 60(b), supra note 117, at 76 n.3.
435 Dodson, supra note 416, at 379.
436 Id. at 379–80; FED. R. CIV. P. 60 advisory committee’s note to 1946 amendment.
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At the time, within Rule 60(b)(3)’s reference to ill-defined misdeeds437 and Rule
60(b)(5)’s obeisance to unmoored equity438 lay the seeds of future tumult; openly
endorsing no constraint other than whether “any reason justifying relief,” Rule
60(b)(6) invited cautious evolution at best—and anarchy at worst.439 Fittingly, in the
decades since Rule 60 was first introduced, the fluid language of these three provisions
has allowed an interpretive miasma to encumber their practical operation, one partly
traceable to the Court’s haphazard unilateral penchants. If Rule 60(b) is to truly serve
its intended function in a manner consistent with federal procedural law’s consecrated
virtues,440 neither equity441 nor justice442 can excuse any future adherence to
misbegotten exegeses. By law and custom, the past must still guide, but it must not so
overwhelm. Otherwise, the mostly forgotten writs, with all their attendant
complications, will be reborn in spirit, if not form, in the common tongue, if not
Augustan patter. Omnia mutantur nos et mutamur in illis, in the words of that

437 Compare O’Neal v. Burger Chef Sys., Inc., 860 F.2d 1341, 1347 (6th Cir. 1988) (common
law defines fraud to include certain omissions, “i.e., failure to disclose material facts when under
a duty to do so”), with Platsis v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 946 F.2d 38, 41–42 (6th Cir. 1991) (even
an innocent misrepresentation claim must be based on an affirmative misstatement).
438 FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(5); see also, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 300 (1955)
(“[E]quity has been characterized by a practical flexibility in shaping its remedies and by a
facility for adjusting and reconciling public and private needs.”); Thompson v. U.S. Dep’t of
Hous. & Urb. Dev., 404 F.3d 821, 830 (4th Cir. 2005) (“The hallmark of equity, of course, is
its flexibility . . . .”); cf. SEC v. Worthen, 98 F.3d 480, 482 (9th Cir. 1996) (“With respect to
permanent injunctions, we have held that Rule 60(b)(5) represents a codification of preexisting
law, recognizing the inherent power of a court sitting in equity to modify its decrees
prospectively to achieve equity.”) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Transgo, Inc. v.
Ajac Transmission Parts Corp., 911 F.2d 363, 365 (9th Cir. 1990)).
439 FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(6) (repealed 1946); see also Peters v. Bryan (In re Bryan), 429 B.R.
1, 10 n.27 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2010) (correctly characterizing Rule 60(b)(6) as “a catch-all
provision for any reason to reverse a final judgment that does not meet the other standards of
Rule 60(b)”).
440 Cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (“[The rules] should be construed, administered, and employed by
the court and the parties to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every
action and proceeding.”).
441 See Berger v. Heckler, 771 F.2d 1556, 1568 (2d Cir. 1985) (“[B]readth and flexibility are
inherent in equitable remedies.”) (quoting Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402
U.S. 1, 15 (1971)).
442 See Salazar v. District of Columbia, 633 F.3d 1110, 1116 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (“Rule 60(b)(6)
. . . grants federal courts broad authority to relieve a party from a final judgment upon such
terms as are just.”) (Internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Liljeberg v. Health Servs.
Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 863 (1988)).
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emperor’s self-proclaimed successors,443 their lineage more dubious than that of many
of the law’s once awesome444 writs.445

443 CLASSICAL AND FOREIGN QUOTATIONS: A POLYGLOT MANUAL OF HISTORICAL AND
LITERARY SAYINGS, NOTED PASSAGES IN POETRY AND PROSE, PHRASES, PROVERBS, AND BONS
MOTS 245 (3d ed. 1904). This phrase—“All things change, and we change amongst them”—
was one of a series of similar mottoes utilized by various emperors, this one being designed for
Lothair I. Id. Lothair served as the Holy Roman Emperor from 817 to 855 CE, ruling a loose
polity that saw itself as the successor of the Roman Empire founded by Augustus in 27 BCE.
PETER H. WILSON, HEART OF EUROPE: A HISTORY OF THE HOLY ROMAN EMPIRE 38–39 (2016).
444 Dating to 1578, the oldest meaning of the English adjective “awesome” is something
which is “full of awe[.]” Awesome, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2010). As this
denotation has become antiquated, the term “awe-inspiring” is now generally used to convey
awesome’s original import. Id. In a nod to this Article’s historicism (and the author’s fascination
with antiquity), this sentence utilizes the word “awesome” in its ancient sense.
445 United States v. Beggerly, 524 U.S. 38, 43 (1998) (quoting the committee’s derisive
description of “a handful of writs, the precise contours of which were ‘shrouded in ancient lore
and mystery’”); FED. R. CIV. P. 60 advisory committee’s note to 1946 amendment; see supra
Part II.A.1. By the 1700s, the hegemony of the Holy Roman Empire had waned, the subject of
an immortal Voltairean quip: “This agglomeration which was called and which still calls itself
the Holy Roman Empire was in no way holy, nor Roman, nor an empire.” THE YALE BOOK OF
QUOTATIONS 792 (Fred R. Shapiro ed., 2006).
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